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 __________________________________________________________________ Abstract III 
 
If logic is untrue, this is because it is logical. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The focus of this thesis is minimal semantics and the semantic/pragmatic distinction. My 
assumption is that whether you are a Contextualist or a Semantic Minimalist, it is nevertheless 
important to get clarity on what genuine linguistic semantic content is. Further, I think the 
theorizing at the level of minimal semantics is the right place to begin building a theory. 
 The thesis is that it is possible to explain genuine semantics with no pragmatic intrusion, 
and still be able to account for propositionality all over.    
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1. Introduction 
 
There are two more or less clearly opposite directions in the relatively modern debate on 
context and theory of meaning. On one side there are the Contextualists and on the other side, 
the Semantic Minimalists. 
 At the core of the debate are the questions, - what a semantic theory should look like, and 
what can or should be viewed as theoretically relevant. Most important are their opposite 
views on the role of context. The Contextualist claims that sentences must be understood (as 
truth conditional) relative to contexts, while the Semantic Minimalist holds that context must 
be kept apart from the truth evaluation of content.
1
 On this background their different aims 
and scopes emerge. There are many different ways and tools for the aim of explaining how 
they disagree, and this thesis will only look at some of them. The main issue for the debate 
will be how to treat and look at literal meaning and explicit content. Another area that to some 
extent will be discussed is how to look at literal meaning (and explicit content) connected 
with the idea of a language of thought. 
  The proponents of Semantic Minimalism will be Herman Cappelen, Ernie Lepore and 
Emma Borg. Cappelen and Lepore’s view will mainly be understood according to their book 
Insensitive Semantics, and Borg’s view according to her book Minimal Semantics. The main 
opponents will be the Relevance Theorist Robyn Carston and the Minimal Contextualist Kent 
Bach, but we will also look at other theoreticians. 
 Relevance Theory is first and foremost a theory about communication, and compared to 
Semantic Minimalism, a rather different project. Carston’s main work in this field is her book 
Thoughts and Utterances - The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication, and as the title 
indicates, the main goal is to explain and give an account of explicit communication. 
Contained in what she take as explicitly communicated, are in various ways and degrees 
enrichments and developments of literal sentences added to the proposition. This divide 
indicates a difference between two levels, the (linguistic) level of semantic representation and 
a level of what is said/stated which on Carston’s framework is the level of explicatures. There 
is also a third level, and this is the level of implicatures. This level is wholly pragmatically 
                                                 
1
  A Semantic Minimalist recognizes a subset of context dependent expressions; these are more or less the same 
as the indexicals on David Kaplan’s list in his paper 'Demonstratives' from 1989 (this is in particular true of 
Cappelen and Lepore’s theory. Borg’s theory recognizes a few more expressions).    
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implicated while the level of explicatures (what is said/stated) might have added or enriched 
content which is pragmatically implicated. Generally, on one hand, there are literal sentences, 
and on the other hand, there is communicated content, and this is either an explicature or an 
implicature. So a simple model will be that there is a thought/mental representation 
(proposition) expressed via a literal sentence. The content of this thought/mental 
representation is then recovered by a hearer via processing skills and other (linguistic and/or 
non-linguistic) information connected with the idea of relevance. 
 Semantic Minimalism has a more narrow scope for what they think is explainable. The 
central issue and area for their theorizing is the literal content and meaning of declarative 
sentences conjoined with appropriate truth conditions. In order to account for what a 
declarative sentence literally means, one has to look at the syntax and compositionality of the 
sentence, and what they call minimal truth preserving entities, i.e., minimal word meanings 
which are explainable without contextual factors. In limiting the scope as they do, the central 
aim is to preserve a determinable semantic level of content.  
 This level is defended against objections which claim is that content is truth evaluable only 
with respect to context sensitivity. Another aim is to keep the theorizing at a level which is 
workable and systematic.   
 On this background
2
 is any view attempting to implement context sensitivity beyond what 
is seen as needed to account for the expressions on the list of context-sensitive expressions 
seen as impossible projects. This is generally because of the lack of theoretical access to 
“real” contextual information. Theorizing above the level of literal or semantic content is seen 
as very speculative and even impossible in connection with real contexts, and is because of 
this presented as an additional view and theory they call 'Speech Act Pluralism'. In keeping 
these views or theories separated, they have provided two frameworks of how to deal with 
literal meaning, -one where the literal content is seen as stable propositions and another where 
this content changes into other propositions. The meaning of a speech-act is on this view 
(probably) always something else than the literal content and this is viewed in respect to 
different possible worlds. Possible worlds are artificial constructs based on possible different 
intentions, context sensitivity and contextual features in general. The general claim is that 
allowing context sensitivity in theorizing necessarily makes content plural because of the 
effects context and intentions have on content.  
                                                 
2
  This is in particular a presentation of Cappelen and Lepore’s view, but the front against Contextualism is 
shared with Borg and also Bach to some extent.   
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 Speech Act Pluralism has two important functions; it is in general used as argument for 
adopting a Semantic Minimalist view, and as a theory which claim is that this is the only way 
to see speech act content. A difference between Contextualism and Speech Act Pluralism is 
that the Contextualist sees the need for taking the respective context into account while the 
Speech Act Pluralist doesn't think this can be done.  
 While the Semantic Minimalists’ overarching aim is to persuade the reader to appreciate 
minimal propositions as theoretical superior, the Contextualist wants to explain how 
communication works. The Relevance Theoretic approach which was originated in Deirdre 
Wilson and Dan Sperber’s work is partly a formal theory. Logical form has an important role 
to play, but is less essential compared to the Semantic Minimalist approach.   
 A disagreement which will be discussed in this connection is the dispute concerning truth 
conditions and truth-evaluability. This discussion can be seen operative in (at least) two ways. 
That is, the status of minimal propositions as propositional (i.e. complete and truth evaluable) 
or as sub-propositional (not yet truth evaluable), and a dispute about how and when linguistic 
or semantic content become or are truth evaluable. This latter question may be applicable to at 
least three levels of meaning. The following is presented in Carston’s book Thoughts and 
Utterances as Bach’s proposal of “the pragmatic picture” in general (verbal communication): 
 
a. logical form or semantic representation of the linguistic expression used (a 
propositional schema); 
b. what is said (minimal proposition or propositional radical);  
c. pragmatically developed (completed and/or expanded) propositional form 
(“impliciture”/explicature); 
d. pragmatically inferred propositional forms (implicature(s)). 
 
 Note that in the relevance-theoretic account there is no level corresponding to the 
second of these.
 3
 
 
As Carston’s note states, the Relevance Theoretic account doesn’t include the second level of 
meaning. This level is comparable to the minimal proposition endorsed by the Semantic 
Minimalists. The main difference between Bach’s view and the Semantic Minimalist view is 
that Bach takes the literal level to be sub-propositional and the Semantic Minimalist take it to 
be propositional. The difference between Bach’s and Carston’s sub-proposition is minimal. 
                                                 
3
  Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and Utterances. ‘The Explicit/Implicit Distinction.’. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., 171. 
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Still, there is a more fundamental difference according to what counts as what is said. Bach’s 
what is said, is the minimal sub-proposition or proposition radical (level b) and Carston’s 
what is said is on the level of an impliciture or an explicature (level c). The notion 
‘impliciture’ is Bach’s notion and is quite similar to Carston’s explicature. The reason why 
Bach uses this term is to highlight that there is implicated content in addition to the explicit 
content. This is also the case with Carston’s notion ‘explicature’, but she still take this as the 
content which is explicated, hence an ‘explicature’.    
 What I now will do is to use the above suggestion and sligthly change it in a way that gives 
the Semantic Minimalists’ minimal proposition a level separable from the other levels. The 
second level will be credited the Semantic Minimalists only: 
 
a. logical form or semantic representation of the linguistic expression used 
(a propositional schema or radical); 
b. minimal proposition;  
c. pragmatically developed (completed and/or expanded) propositional 
form (impliciture/explicature); 
d. pragmatically inferred propositional forms (implicature(s)). 
 
I will introduce a sentence in order to show how this can be seen as mapped to the levels 
above. There will be a lot of talk about age in this thesis, so I’ll stick to this:  
 
a. Jane is old. 
b. ‘Jane is old’ is true if and only if Jane is old  
c. Jane is old [compared to the kids]. 
d. Jane is too old to enjoy the theater, because the play is made for kids. 
 
The Semantic Minimalist is concerned about level (b) and in order to avoid duality, level (b) 
is seen as the only real level of semantic meaning. Speech-acts, which are manifest on level 
(c) and (d) are seen as out of reach of what they think is explainable. The reason for this is 
that indefinitely many propositions can be the content on these levels because there is no 
direct evidence for what these propositions could be like. Perhaps more important is the point 
that the content on level (c) and (d) are not taken to be semantic content. Cappelen and 
Lepore: 
 
  
 ________________________________________________________________ Introduction 5 
 
(6) The proposition semantically expressed by an utterance u of a (declarative) sentence S 
does not exhaust the speech act content of u. An utterance of a sentence S typically says, 
asserts, claims, etc. a wide range of propositions in addition to the proposition 
semantically expressed.  
(7) An epistemic corollary of thesis (6), one that cannot be emphasized enough, is that 
intuitions about, and other evidence for, speech act content are not direct evidence for 
semantic content: an intuition to the effect that an utterance u said that p is not even 
prima facie evidence that p is the proposition semantically expressed by u. This is so no 
matter how refined, reflected, or “equilibriumized” the intuition in question might be.4  
 
 Some Moderate Contextualist thinks that level (c) is a level which can be accounted for, 
and a fundamental debate between Cappelen and Lepore and the Moderate Contextualists is 
about which expressions belong on a list of (genuinely) context-sensitive expressions. When 
or if this latter difference is the only difference, the theorizing is quite similar to Cappelen and 
Lepore’s approach and Semantic Minimalism in general. The level of dispute and theorizing 
is then primarily on level (b) with some relations to level (c) viewed from the perspective of a 
Moderate Contextualist. The approach in general is to only consider the contextual 
information the context-sensitive expressions demand or require. 
 The Relevance Theorist is trying to account for all the above levels and truth-conditionality 
is only considered at level (c) and/or (d). For this aim, a lot of pragmatic principles are seen as 
theoretically relevant and the most fundamental principle is relevance. The Relevance 
Theorist has a broad area of discourse, and is what one may call full blown Contextualists. 
Decoding and inference is central for the Relevance Theorists and is located within our 
cognitive capacities.  
 The Relevance Theorists’ agenda is to explain communication and the traditional code 
model is kept within their approach. The role it is assumed to play is however essential lesser 
than the classical approaches assumed was right: 
 
Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail one of Grice's central 
claims: that an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-
verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice 1989: Essays 1-7, 14, 18; 
Retrospective Epilogue). In developing this claim, Grice laid the foundations for an 
inferential model of communication, an alternative to the classical code model. According 
to the code model, a communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which is 
decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code. According to the inferential 
                                                 
4
  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 145. 
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model, a communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, 
which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided. An utterance is, of 
course, a linguistically coded piece of evidence, so that verbal comprehension involves an 
element of decoding. However, the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding is just one of 
the inputs to a non-demonstrative inference process which yields an interpretation of the 
speaker meaning.
5  
 
As the last sentence indicates, the role of semantics or linguistically coded pieces of evidence 
is given a rather small part to play in an overall picture of communication. Even though 
sentences often play a crucial part in communicative exchange, Relevance Theory also takes 
into account other types of communication and the concept of relevance plays the most 
central role. Paul Grice said ‘be relevant’6; the Relevance Theorists took this idea and said 
that relevance is the mediating concept for communication in general:  
  
 Intuitively, relevance is not just an all-or-none matter but a matter of degree. There is no 
shortage of potential inputs which might have at least some relevance for us, but we cannot 
attend to them all. Relevance theory claims that what makes an input worth picking out 
from the mass of competing stimuli is not just that it is relevant, but that it is more relevant 
than an alternative input available to us at that time. Intuitively, other things being equal, 
the more worthwhile conclusions achieved by processing an input, the more relevant it will 
be.
7
 
 
The Relevance Theorists’ most general conception for something communicated is 'ostensive 
behavior'. This may be utterances, body language, signs or other. The theoretical looseness 
indicated above presents Relevance Theory as aiming to explain essential features of 
communication and is then more like a phenomenological theory compared to formal 
approaches: “The central claim of Relevance Theory is that the expectations of relevance 
raised by an utterance are precise enough, and predictable enough, to guide the hearer towards 
the speaker’s meaning.”8 
 The above is a minimal presentation of Relevance Theory. As already noted, the discussion 
in this thesis has a more narrow scope and the main focus is semantic or linguistic meaning. 
So there will be almost no discussion of level (d), but there will be some suggestions of how 
                                                 
5
  Wilson, Deirdre and Sperber, Dan. 2002. ‘Relevance Theory.’. In UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 14, 
249-287, 249. 
6
  Grice, Paul. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words.’ Logic and Conversation.’. London: Harvard University 
Press.  
7
  Wilson, Deirdre and Sperber, Dan. 2002. ‘Relevance Theory.’, 252. 
8
  Wilson, Deirdre and Sperber, Dan. 2002. ‘Relevance Theory.’, 250. 
  
 ________________________________________________________________ Introduction 7 
 
sentences can or could be interpreted at this level. The above presentation of Relevance 
Theory is intended to give a picture of how it works, because I believe it will be a help in 
understanding why Carston argues as she does. The underdeterminacy thesis is central for this 
thesis and the picture given above of how communication works: 
 
What is meant by this is that the linguistic semantics of the utterance, that is, the 
meanings encoded in the linguistic expressions used, the relatively stable meanings in a 
linguistic system, meanings which are widely shared across a community of users of the 
system, underdetermines the proposition expressed (what is said). The hearer has to 
undertake processes of pragmatic inference in order to work out not only what the 
speaker is implicating but also what proposition she is directly expressing.
9
 
 
Generally why the underdetermination thesis is manifest in the Contextualists’ theories is 
because they think propositionality, i.e., truth conditional content in all or most cases is 
manifest on level (c) and/or (d). So generally what they think counts as propositional content 
is something more than linguistic content or something other than the linguistic content 
expressed. 
 Cappelen and Lepore labels arguments resting on the underdeterminacy thesis 
‘incompleteness arguments’ and stresses that they are all wrong.  
 Quite important in this connection are the different views on directions of fit
10
. Borg 
explains the Contextualist approach and the idea of directions of fit are applied to pragmatic 
processes:  
 
This is the idea that pragmatic processes are capable of acting twice: once prior to the 
delivery of a complete proposition expressed (that is, prior to determining the truth-
conditional content of the sentence as uttered in a given context) and then once again to 
                                                 
9
  Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and Utterances. ‘Pragmatics and Linguistic Underdeterminacy.’, 19 – 20.   
10
  Some theoreticians says that J, L. Austin was the first to introduce the term ‘direction of fit’, but he used it 
differently from what is usually assosiated with the term. Elisabeth Anscombe is credited the conception, but 
not the term. (See the shopping list example in her book Intention from 1957: § 32 page 57).  I use it in 
Anscombe’s spirit as John Searle suggests, as a domain specific conception separating between a one way or 
a two way direction of fit, i.e., the content is derivable from logical form and sentences to propositions as a 
one way direction of fit or a two way direction of fit where this is included plus non- linguistic content 
derivable from intention and context. (Simplified the two ways of direction can be explained as word to 
world or world to word.) This is derivable from the presentations of the two ways of pragmatic processing. 
When Borg discusses this topic she uses the term ‘dependency’ and she presents six possible ways to see the 
relationship between a semantic theory and what is said. What is said is presented by two different 
conceptions: what is said and what is said*. Borg, Emma. 2004. Minimal Semantics, 110 - 131.                                                                     
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yield any implicatures of the utterance (i.e. any further, indirectly conveyed, 
propositions).
11
  
   
The pragmatic processes that are acting prior to the delivery of a complete proposition are 
acting in order to get from the uttered content to an explicature or impliciture (level c). The 
pragmatic processes acting after an explicature or impliciture is given, is meant to give the 
content on level (d), i.e., an implicature. The direction of fit goes two ways: from 
linguistically encoded meaning to communicated explicated meaning and from context to 
communicated meaning. Borg puts it like this: “Thus our two stages of pragmatic 
interpretation might engage in the following way: 
 
U utters ’s’: 
(i) linguistic decoding + pragmatics → explicature 
(what is stated/said) 
(ii) what is stated + pragmatics → what is implied12  
 
The presentation of Relevance Theory as a whole gives a picture of a phenomenological 
theory. This, I think, shows that Borg's presentation above can be read as a simplification 
which systematically explains communication. Still, this presentation is on line with how the 
Relevance Theorists presents their view. So, I take it to be at least two ways to read the 
Relevance Theoretic approach: as a phenomenological theory and as a more systematic 
theory. 
 The systematic approach begins with the encoded level, then recovers the explicature and 
then again recovers the implicature, and the implicature and the explicature are seen as 
distinct entities. 
 
There are two types of communicated assumptions on the relevance-theoretic account: 
explicatures and implicatures. An “explicature” is a propositional form communicated by an 
utterance which is pragmatically constructed on the basis of the propositional schema or 
template (logical form) that the utterance encodes; its content is an amalgam of 
linguistically decoded material and pragmatically inferred material. An “implicature” is any 
other propositional form communicated by an utterance; its content consists of wholly 
pragmatically inferred matter (see Sperber & Wilson 1986, 182). So the 
                                                 
11
  Borg, Emma. 2004. Minimal Semantics. New York: Oxford University Press, 38.  
12
  Borg, Emma. 2004. Minimal Semantics, 42. 
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explicature/implicature distinction is a derivational distinction and, by definition, it arises 
only for verbal (or, more generally, code-based) ostensive communication.
13  
 
Carston and the Relevance Theorists’ are offering a lot of principles and distinctions, and even 
though it seems like they actually think that these principles explain how communication 
works, and that they are real features, many of the principles should first and foremost be 
thought of as theoretical tools for the best explanation.  
 The distention between explicatures and implicatures as suggested above may end up not 
so easily drawn after some consideration. This and similar suggestions about pragmatic 
distinctions and principles is something the Relevance Theorist is aware of being problematic. 
So the idea of Relevance Theory in particular and Contextualism in general should more or 
less be interpreted as theories for the best explanation.  
 I have no intention of going into detail about this, but just as an indication, I will give some 
explanation for what this may amount to: 
 
6. a. It's raining. 
b. It's raining in Churchland, New Zealand, at time t.
14
 
 
The content of (b) is an explicature and the content of (a) is the logical form which is taken to 
be sub-propositional content. As we see, the logical form is kept in the explicature so the 
explicature is a development of the logical form and the implicated content is added to the 
logical form. The definition of implicatures tells us that the content is wholly pragmatically 
inferred, so the content of an implicature should be entirely different from the logical form or 
sub-proposition and from the explicature. This may be true only in some cases because it is 
probably some elements in the implicature which are also part of the explicature, and it seems 
like “the conception” of implicatures also sometimes must be part of the explicature. 
Consider: “[…], it looks very much as if the pragmatic principle(s) responsible for fixing 
values of indexicals and other contextual elements of the proposition expressed are the same 
as those involved in the derivation of implicatures.”15 Evidently, there is indexicality16 present 
in the explicature above indicating a place and a time.  
                                                 
13
  Carston, Robyn. 2004. ‘Explicature and Semantics.’, 9. 
14
  Carston, Robyn. 2004. ‘Explicature and Semantics.’, 9. 
15
  Carston, Robyn. 2004. ‘Explicature and Semantics.’, 8. 
16
  Indexicality or indexical behaviour points to or indicates states of affairs, like for instance the indexical ‘I’ 
points to there being someone who refers to themselves and the above sentence (a) is assumed to point to or 
maybe rather indicate a location and a time.   
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 However, there is a difference between the pragmatic principles responsible for the 
derivation of implicatures and how the concept of implicatures is defined as type of content 
(communicated assumptions). So the distinction seems to be valid to some extent, but I think 
it is hard to draw in a lot of cases.   
 As already noted, my intention was not to go into this discussion, but only to indicate that 
Relevance Theory first and foremost should be viewed as a phenomenological theory and so 
to see the more detailed systematic theorizing in this light. This I think is important for the 
understanding of Relevance Theory in general, and should be kept in mind when the attack 
from Semantic Minimalism is considered.  
 Carston presents two ways of seeing the discussion between Contextualism and Semantic 
Minimalism in her review of Borg's book Minimal Semantics:  
  
According to the minimalist (or “literalist”), natural language sentences represent the world 
as being a certain way and are true or false depending on how the world is. The 
Contextualist maintains that this is a category mistake, that it is utterances or speech acts 
that have such content and whatever semantic properties sentences have, it is only in 
conjunction with the non-linguistic information in contexts of utterance that eventuate in 
truth-conditional content. In other words, minimalists believe that there is a formally-
driven, pragmatics-free level of semantic content without quite extensive pragmatic input. 
Viewed this way it certainly sounds like a substantive debate. 
 However, there is another way of looking at the territory which makes the difference in 
the positions seem rather less momentous. […] Given a clear distinction between sentence-
type meaning and what is said, which Borg and most current minimalists agree on, the 
debate reduces to a disagreement about the nature of sentence-type meaning, effectively the 
issue of just how minimal it is. Somewhat ironically, it is the Contextualist who tends to go 
for the most minimalist treatment of sentence meaning-as subpropositional, a mere 
propositional radical, a schema or template for building propositions-while the Semantic 
Minimalist insist that it is fully propositional, albeit seldom constituting the content of what 
the speaker said, which has to be constructed pragmatically on its basis.
17
  
   
How we interpret the first sentence is central for the understanding of Carston’s criticism 
above, and I think she presents Semantic Minimalism slightly wrong. How the Semantic 
Minimalist sees truth-conditionality will be discussed more extensively later, but for the 
moment I will highlight that the Semantic Minimalist is concerned about truth-conditionality 
in a way which does not necessarily judge sentences as true or false, but rather is satisfied 
                                                 
17
  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Review Minimal Semantics by Emma Borg.’. In Mind & Language, vol. 23 No. 3 
June 2008.  359 – 367, 359 - 360. 
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when sentences can be judged as truth-evaluable if the content of a sentence is determinable, 
and we can think of the world or a world being in such a state that the sentence could be 
judged as true or false. Still, Carston is right in some extent that the Semantic Minimalist 
thinks that there is a formally driven pragmatic free level of content, but this is something 
Carston agrees on.  
 Even though there is agreement between Cappelen and Lepore and Borg about the 
rejection of Contextualism as a possible project in general, Cappelen and Lepore's rejection is 
in general interpretable as extensively harder than Borg's. Still, the possibility of accounting 
for propositionality on the levels of explicatures and implicatures other than within the 
framework of Speech Act Pluralism is seen as default, so genuine propositionality from the 
formal point of view is seen as only possible on the level of sentence-type meaning.  
 Carston's assertion above which states that it is the Contextualist approach which goes for 
the most minimal treatment of semantic content as sub-propositions, may show us that it is the 
Contextualist which operates with the most minimal “proposition” (as sub-propositional). In 
the article 'Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction', this is 
Carston’s main argumentative point. So her strategy is to show that the Semantic Minimalist 
in fact is blurring the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and that it is her 
treatment of semantic content that manages to keep semantics and pragmatics as distinct 
features.  
 The one way direction of fit endorsed by the Semantic Minimalist is shared by the 
Relevance Theorists when only talk of strict semantics is considered, so there may be no real 
disagreement about the first part of the quote to come, but considerable disagreement about 
the latter part: 
 
According to formal accounts, we should begin our analysis at the level of a formal 
description of a sentence-type and recover content via formal operations on this syntactic 
description. Whereas according to use-based accounts, we should begin our analysis at 
the level of the utterance and recover semantic content via an examination of the role that 
that utterance is playing.
18
 
 
 As already indicated, The Relevance Theorist has as part of the systematic side of their theory 
the code model presented above, so when there is a theoretic aim to recover the semantic 
                                                 
18
  Borg, Emma. 2004. Minimal Semantics, 4. 
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meaning of sentences, the methodology is more or less the same as endorsed by Semantic 
Minimalism. The latter part of the quote is not really true of Relevance Theory (and are not 
meant to be either) and works more like a generalization of Contextualism. The two way 
direction of fit endorsed by the Relevance Theorist is simply put as a word to world direction 
of fit and a world to word direction of fit. The latter can be seen as input to the communicated 
content from non-linguistic information.  
 Non-linguistic information is by the Semantic Minimalist generally held to be kept out of 
the picture except for the information needed which interacts directly as a meta-representation 
connected to the sentence and further when there are expressions held to be context-sensitive 
present in sentences. The direction of fit is especially important in this latter connection. The 
context-sensitive expressions are taken to syntactically trigger non-linguistic information and 
contextual features. Borg’s conception of direction of fit is also applied to indirect speech 
reports: “(d) One-way dependency-semantic analyses to indirect speech reports. Judgments 
concerning correct indirect speech reports are affected by the semantic analyses of the original 
sentence, but not visa versa.”19  
 The conception of indirect speech reports is used by Cappelen and Lepore as well, and will 
be discussed and presented later. For now it is enough to know that we have a correct or true 
indirect speech report if the content of a sentence is complete. Completeness is a central aim 
for the Semantic Minimalist and if content is complete it is also truth conditional or truth 
evaluable.  
 Borg takes this idea and moves it over to the idea of a language of thought. Completeness 
is then viewed as there being an encapsulated module in our cognitive apparatus which is 
working with (almost only) linguistic processing. According to Borg, there are several reasons 
for taking this step, but the main reason may be that this is needed for the task of explaining 
how to treat expressions which syntactically trigger contexts sensitivity. Cappelen and 
Lepore’s theory does not go so far as suggesting in detail how to deal with these expressions, 
but has as a central task a methodological way of recognizing them.  
 Borg’s solution does arguably take into account features belonging to the pragmatic 
domain, and the strategy is to formalize objective features belonging to this domain. Since the 
pragmatic features are seen as syntactically triggered, the formalized contextual elements are 
seen as processed within the encapsulated module for a language of thought, rather than in the 
abductive domain of our cognitive capacity. So the distinction between semantics and 
                                                 
19
  Borg, Emma. 2004. Minimal Semantics, 114. 
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pragmatics are seen as underpinning two different kinds of comprehension processes. This 
way of drawing the distinction is in general the same as in Relevance Theory, so Borg’s 
theory can be seen as being at service for the Relevance Theorist rather than as an opponent. 
This is something she from time to time mentions in her book, but her theorizing and positive 
account have as object of investigation what a formal semantic theory can be seen as able to 
do and as explanation of what semantics in a more or less strict sense amounts to. 
 Carston’s use of a Fodorian language of thought shares the same idea, but is still used in a 
different manner. A simple explanation is that this of course is for the aim of motivating the 
idea of Contextualism and Relevance Theory in general and in particular as argument for 
propositionality on the level of explicatures as opposed to minimal propositions. The content 
of language of thought-sentences (mentalese sentences) is on this view not explicatures, but is 
seen as possibly having the same type and amount of content, and the idea is that it is 
impossible that they are not fully propositional. 
 As Carston points out, there is generally two ways to see the debate between 
Contextualism and Semantic Minimalism. Quite simplified; as a discussion about what counts 
as propositional content and what counts as sub-propositional content.  
 Semantic Minimalism is explainable as attempts of explaining (pure) semantics, so their 
semantic theories can be seen as attempts of keeping the theorizing at the semantic side of the 
semantic/pragmatic distinction as far as possible. The Contextualist does also find this 
interesting, so I think it is in this area of theorizing they have something to learn from each 
other. Further, I hope the debate in general and this thesis in particular will bring some fruitful 
results, useful for both Semantic Minimalism and Contextualism and others as well. 
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2. The Semantic/Pragmatic Distinction. 
 
2.1. The Semantic/Pragmatic Distinction, Propositionality and Sub-Propositionality  
 
I'm all for pragmatics. But I don't think it helps the cause to blur the boundary between 
semantics and pragmatics. […]. 
 The basic reason is this. Even though, as people have been pointing out for some years 
now, the linguistic meaning of a given sentence generally underdetermines what a speaker 
means in uttering it, it does not follow that linguistic meaning is infected or infested by 
what some of these same people call 'pragmatic meaning'. There is no such thing as 
pragmatic meaning, at least nothing that is commensurate with linguistic meaning. There is 
what the sentence means and what the speaker means in uttering it
.20
 
 
The suggestion that there usually is a difference between what a sentence means and what a 
speaker means in uttering it, is not an issue of disagreement. All the theorists presented in this 
thesis acknowledge this difference.  
 Here are some questions we will look at: Is there really any disagreement concerning the 
existence of the distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning? Is the 
disagreement rather about how one should look at it and where one should draw the line 
between semantics and pragmatics? As Bach in the quote above is driving at, there are two 
ways of looking at the distinction, -one clear cut distinction between semantic or linguistic 
meaning and pragmatic meaning and one that allows pragmatic meaning to interfere on the 
semantic level. The suggestion that there is no such thing as pragmatic meaning, seems to be 
in need of special interpretation, when he also says that he is all for pragmatics. One assumed 
intention behind this utterance is a complaint about different views on what semantics 
amounts to. More directly interpretable from the quote is a complaint about theories which 
allow pragmatics to interfere with semantic meaning in such a way that it looks like pragmatic 
meaning is part of the semantic content.   
 Cappelen may have similar or familiar considerations when he proposes:  
 
[...] there's no such thing as the semantic-pragmatic distinction and looking for it is a waste 
of time. No such distinction will do any important explanatory work. You can as I will 
below, label some level of content 'semantic content', but in so doing no interesting problem 
is solved and no puzzling data illuminated. To explain inter-contextual variability across 
                                                 
20
  Bach, Kent. 2004. ’Minding the Gap. The Semantic-Pragmatic Gap.’, In The Semantics/Pragmatics 
Distinction. Claudia Bianchi (ed.). CSLI Publications. 27 – 43, 27.  
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different areas of discourse we will need an arsenal of explanatory models and data-
gathering procedures.
21
  
 
First of all, I think, this has to be interpreted as a plea for simplicity. Second it seems to 
indicate that Cappelen’s own use of the term 'semantic content' is a special use. The book 
Insensitive Semantics is a defense of a method or methods to keep pragmatics and the literal 
level as distinct features as far as they see possible, so arguably a special way to make the 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics.  
 Carston sees their view as a combination of option three and four in her listing of five 
possible views on the distinction:
22
  
 
(1) Context-independent linguistically encoded meaning (LEM) versus speaker meaning 
(or communicated meaning or utterance meaning). 
(2) LEM plus contextual values for pure indexicals versus speaker meaning. 
(3) LEM plus contextual values for all indexicals versus (the rest of) speaker meaning. 
(4) Minimal proposition expressed versus (the rest of) speaker meaning. 
(5) Intuitive proposition expressed versus (the rest of) speaker meaning.23 
 
 As the first four options above suggest, the discussion is narrowed down to how and where 
one should draw the line between semantics and pragmatics. The view Carston argues for in 
her article 'Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction' is option (1), 
and is most importantly connected with the idea that context-independent linguistically 
encoded meaning (LEM) has to be seen as unrelated to truth conditions.    
 On Carston’s view, there are two ways it can be seen as unrelated or related to truth 
conditions; as non-propositional and sub-propositional. Option (1) doesn't mention sub-
propositionality, so interpreted unrelated to other issues, it can be interpreted as a non-
propositional view on semantic meaning. Sub-propositionality is related to the idea of 
propositionality and non-propositionality is not related or related as a denial of relation. 
Carston's general view on meaning is a combination of option (1) and (5), and sub-
propositionality is in this respect to view LEM as not yet truth-conditional, i.e. as not yet 
propositional. As Bach proposes, this is the view that semantic or linguistic meaning generally 
                                                 
21
  Cappelen, Herman. 2007. ‘Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues.’. In Preyer, Gerhard and Peter, 
George (eds). 2007. Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. New Essays on Semantics and 
Pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press, 3. 
22
  Carston, Robyn. 2008.  ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction.’, 15. 
23
  Carston, Robyn. 2008.  ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction.’, 3. 
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underdetermines what is meant by a sentence, but may also be seen as underdetermination on 
the semantic level. 
 All the present participants in the discussion seem to have some problems with the 
meaning of 'semantic' and this is partly rooted in a history of different uses. Carston who 
claims that all other uses than the one in option (1) are contributing to blur the distinction 
between semantics and pragmatics, is in fact using the term in a number of ways in her book 
Thoughts and Utterances, and may in this respect be seen as the number one target of Bach's 
criticism above. But this might not matter, if it is only terminological matters. What matter is 
how the different theories deal with the distinction. 
 The main point is that this of course is a terminological matter, but at the core of the 
discussion are not the terminological issues, but the theories themselves. This is perhaps 
partly why there may be reasons to give up the distinction. Still, I think its right to see the 
debate as concentrated on the issue of where and how to draw the distinction. 
 Carston wants to keep it, she writes: 
 
I shall argue that the right way to draw the distinction is in (1) that is a natural distinction 
(between distinct kinds of information and distinct kinds of mental processes). It is a 
distinction that matters, although, somewhat ironically, it may in fact turn out to be better 
viewed as a distinction between syntax and pragmatics, that is, between a semantically 
relevant level of linguistic representation and pragmatically derived representations. I 
believe the distinction in (5) is also a valid distinction, but that it is a distinction between 
kinds of speaker meaning (or communicated propositions) rather than a 
semantics/pragmatics distinction. As for the others, (2)-(4), they merely blur the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction, since pragmatics (concerned with recovering the content 
of a speaker's communicative intention) becomes one of the determinants of semantic 
content. Not only are these not good ways to draw the distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics, they are not worthwhile distinctions of any other sort either; that is, they do no 
useful work, or so I shall argue.
24
 
 
As we see, all the other distinctions other than the one drawn by Carston is accused of 
implementing pragmatics on the semantic level in some sense. So when there is only talk of 
semantic content Carston is positing herself as the most minimalistic theorist with the most 
clear cut distinction between semantic and pragmatic meaning. 
 Bach is represented by option (2) and this indicates only a small difference compared to 
(1). Cappelen and Lepore are represented as holding a view that combines option (3) and (4). 
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  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction.’, 3. 
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The insistence of a truth conditional theory at the semantic level combined with the need for 
application of context when there are indexical expressions present in sentences, is on 
Carston’s view seen as problematic for a semantic level. Two features trigger this, the truth-
conditionality and the application of context, but I think the application of a truth-condition on 
the semantic level, i.e. the minimal propositions seen as complete or genuinely propositional 
(for any declarative sentence) is enough to make it problematic for Carston.  
 To think that truth-conditionality is to add something to the proposition seems to be 
Carston's point, and may be right in the light of some considerations, but may be wrong in the 
light of others. However, she thinks that it is her own and some other Contextualists’ minimal 
sub-proposition which is the most minimal. The following quote is already cited in the 
introduction: 
 
Given a clear distinction between sentence-type meaning and what is said, which Borg and 
most current minimalists agree on, the debate reduces to a disagreement about the nature of 
sentence-type meaning, effectively the issue of just how minimal it is. Somewhat ironically, 
it is the Contextualist who tends to go for the most minimalist treatment of sentence 
meaning – as sub propositional, a mere propositional radical, a schema or template for 
pragmatically building propositions-while the Semantic Minimalist insists that it is fully 
propositional, albeit seldom constituting the content of what the speaker said, which has to 
be constructed pragmatically on its basis.
25
 
 
A crucial difference between Semantic Minimalism and Contextualism becomes evident in 
the light of this quote. The minimalist treats sentence-type meaning as propositional and the 
Contextualist does not. As we remember, Carston's conception of a complete or genuine 
proposition is a thought/mental representation and it may be recovered by a receiver via an 
understanding of a sentence. This general picture motivates her view for looking at sentence-
types as sub-propositional and non-propositional.  
 The motivation for a Semantic Minimalist is to build the theory in a different manner, that 
is, a Davidsonian-style theory. The general assumption is some version of the following. 
Borg: “[...] all propositional or truth-conditional semantic content can be traced back to the 
syntactic level and it is delivered by formal operations over the syntactic representations of 
sentences.”26  
                                                 
25
  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Review Minimal Semantics by Emma Borg.’, 359-360. 
26
  Borg, Emma. 2006. ‘Intention-based Semantics.’. In The Oxford Handbook on Semantics, E. Lepore & B. 
Smith (eds). (The page numbers are from the online paper on Philipapers.),   17. 
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 Understood methodologically, without considering truth conditions and propositionality, 
this is compatible with Carston's conception of semantics in option (1), but if considerations 
about truth conditionality and propositionality are not present in the debate, arguments about 
how minimal the minimal propositions are, loose all their weight. 
 There may be several reasons for adopting a truth-conditional view on the semantic level. 
One is propositional stability – a propositional fall-back which is theoretically ascertained. 
Another is communicative access to the semantic content. The following quote from Cappelen 
and Lepore can be found in Carston’s article ‘Linguistic Communication and the 
Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction’: “[...] the proposition semantically expressed is our 
minimal defense against confusion, misunderstanding, mistakes and it is that which 
guarantees communication across contexts of utterance”27  
 Carston comments as follows: 
 
The basic idea is that semantic content provides us with a reliable shared fallback, a default 
content – when all else fails and we are floundering in a sea of incomprehension, we can at 
least retreat to the one available solid anchor, the semantic content of the sentence, that 
much we can be sure of. Well, of course, the same can be said of LEM and could be said of 
Bach's “what is said”, if there were any such entity. All three positions appear to be offering 
a stable semantic fallback. Still, on the face of it, there is reason to favor C&L's semantic 
content over the other two since theirs is the most fleshed out, and surely the more 
substantial our shared content is the better, the more there is to shore us up against 
mistakes, misunderstandings and confusion. 
 There are two parts to my response to these claims: (a) Cappelen and Lepore's minimal 
semantic content is not generally shared across occurrences of a sentence in no matter what 
context of utterance, and (b) Even if it were common across all contexts, it would not 
provide the right kind of shared content for most purposes to which they (and indeed all of 
us) would want to put such a notion.
28
 
 
Quite interesting is the point that Carston is appreciating, or at least points out that there is 
reason to favor Cappelen and Lepore's view on semantic content. A worry is the truth-
conditional approach on this level and as Bach and Carston argue it may be a good solution to 
view this level as sub-propositional. Carston’s critical response is generally that the minimal 
propositions they offer are not the right kind of shared content and they are not generally the 
shared content in all contexts. To show this latter point, she argues that indexicals and 
context-sensitive expressions in general must be applied to specific contexts and that the 
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  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction.’, 21. 
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speaker’s intentions must be let into the picture. So she says that they cannot be shared across 
contexts. This is precisely the same point suggested by Cappelen and Lepore, and their theory 
is offering a way to recognize the context-sensitive expressions, but lacks specific ways to 
solve the problems. However what counts as a proposition when there are context-sensitive 
expressions present in sentences is the content of the sentence and contextual elements 
applicable to the context-sensitive expressions. So on the face of it, there should be no 
disagreement between Carston and Cappelen and Lepore when obviously context-sensitive 
expressions are considered.  
 One thing Cappelen and Lepore never mention is that when there are expressions from 
their list of context-sensitive expressions present in sentences, the semantic content should be 
viewed as sub-propositional. I think that if they accept this as true, it will be consistent with 
their theory and they will not loose anything if they did.  
 Cappelen and Lepore's view on truth-conditionality is sometimes interpretable as rather 
weak: “Semantic Minimalism as understood in this book, need not take a stand on whether 
semantic content is a proposition, or truth conditions, or what have you. Throughout the book 
we try to remain neutral by couching the issues both in terms of truth conditions and in terms 
of propositions.”29 I think it is right to assume that the idea is that sentences have 
determinable content that might be or can be truth-evaluable in respect to a possible world or 
a context C, if there are elements in the context that coincide directly with the literal content 
of the sentence. These elements are presented on the right hand side of the truth condition, as 
for instance: 
 
(3) Rudolf is happy is true just in case Rudolf is happy, and expresses the proposition that 
Rudolf is happy.
30
 
 
What is most important is that the content of the sentences is determinable. When or if we 
have such determinable content, then we easily can think of how this can correspond to a 
context or a possible world C which contains the same elements. So, the stronger thesis like 
'sentence S is truth-conditional', may not be necessary for their approach. Instead they might 
settle with 'sentence S is truth-evaluable'.  
  However, Semantic Minimalism is a form of propositionalism and a central issue is to 
deliver complete propositions. That Cappelen and Lepore’s theory is dependent on truth-
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  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics. (footnote3), 3.  
30
  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics, 3.  
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conditionality seems to be a central issue when arguing for instance against incompleteness on 
the literal level. In this respect, I don’t think they can be neutral about whether semantic 
content is propositional or not. On the other hand, when the proposal is that the content of 
sentences is the content that can be indirectly reported, it may be that the truth-conditional 
approach is not needed, if this is enough for an explanation of the considered content.     
 Borg is pretty clear on this issue and I think that Cappelen and Lepore will agree on the 
following: 
 
I'm going to take it as pretty much constitutive of formal theories of meaning that they aim 
to deliver a complete meaning for each and every well-formed sentence of some natural 
language. That is to say, the semantic content they promise to deliver is truth-conditional or 
propositional-something which (given a context of evaluation) is truth-evaluable in its own 
right.
31 
 
The most traditional example is perhaps Tarski's conception: 
 
1.  'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. 
  
Again - the context of evaluation is given on the right hand side of the truth condition, and as 
we see, the contextual content is of general nature. So the focus is pointed on the content in 
the sentence as corresponding to a general feature of the world which of course is particular 
on every occasion.  
 Comparing the above conception of a truth-condition with the one suggested by Cappelen 
and Lepore makes me believe that the latter is somewhat weaker. Cappelen and Lepore’s ‘just 
in case’ seems looser or more open than Tarski’s conception. Still, it should have strenght 
enough to make us look away from the even weaker suggestion that truth-conditionality (and 
propositionality) only is a guiding tool.  
 If Cappelen and Lepore were neutral about truth-conditionality and propositionality, the 
seemingly strong case against non-propositionalism and sub-propositionalism would be rather 
weak. On the other hand, this would also weaken Carston's and the other Contextualists' 
complaints about Semantic Minimalism. If we take the issue to be only about the 
determinability of linguistic content it may be that it can guide us towards an agreement 
concerning these issues.  
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 I think it is possible to interpret Cappelen and Lepore’s theory as a weaker theory than 
Borg’s. This is because of their somewhat weak truth-condition and because their theory is not 
entirely formal. This is because they are allowing context-sensitivity in connection with the 
expressions on the list of context-sensitive expressions.
32
 We will as we proceed get back to 
this question at times.   
 Four options on how to look at a semantic level is open for consideration: 
 
1. Sub-propositions – Not yet truth-evaluable. 
2. Non-propositions – Not truth-evaluable.  
3. Propositions – Truth-evaluable. 
4. Neutral propositions – An open question concerning the three options above. 
 
As already noted, I think all five options for drawing the line between semantics and 
pragmatics, as proposed by Carston, must be seen as theoretically loaded. This is generally 
because all five options are meant to be used to give support to a special view. 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Theoretical Neutrality and the Idea of a Neutral Proposition 
  
In the introductory essay of the book Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, named 
‘Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues’, Cappelen has three points of neutrality that 
may help us see the neutral proposition in the right light (the first point is not a point of 
neutrality). This can be seen as a preliminary neutral ground which theoreticians can agree on 
before introducing more theoretical conceptions. The neutral proposition is more minimal, or 
maybe better: more shallow, than any other proposition, because it introduces less theoretical 
framework. As we see, this point is not really about the size of a proposition, but may be seen 
as having impact on where we should draw the line between semantics and pragmatics.   
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I. Semantic content is determined compositionally and every element in the semantic 
value of the sentence is syntactically triggered, i.e. is triggered by elements in the syntax of 
the sentence. 
II. The definition remains neutral about whether these syntactic elements are all 
articulated in the surface grammatical form of the sentence. Some elements in the semantic 
value of S relative to context C might correspond to syntactic components that occur only 
in S's logical form. 
III. The definition remains neutral about whether semantic contents are propositional. 
They might be sub-propositional objects (also known as propositional skeletons […]). 
IV. Finally the definition remains neutral about whether the semantic content of an 
utterance, u, is what was said or asserted by u.
33
 
34
 
 
In the following, I will say a little about the points of neutrality in order to explain some 
issues that are at stake connected to them.   
 Point (I) can be seen as compatible with Carston’s explanation of semantics as context-
independent linguistically encoded meaning (LEM) and the other present theorist do agree 
that this is genuine semantics, so no-one is neutral about this. The latter three points are points 
of neutrality. Point (II) neutralizes a whole range of disagreement. This introduces two general 
philosophical problems which can be found for instance in the theory of metaphysics. This is 
the problem of reduction and the problem of expansion. In the present area of theorizing about 
what counts as a semantic level, this is a central issue. Proponents of the so called ‘Hidden 
Indexical Strategy’, asserts that there is more on the linguistic level to be found in the logical 
form of sentences than what is evidently present, so they might be seen as expanding the 
semantic or literal level. Now, they are obviously not expanding it, if it is existent. 
Nevertheless, there are added expansions in the form of placeholders or descriptions. 
Cappelen and Lepore explain: “[…] the Hidden Indexical Strategy accounts for alleged 
context sensitivity by finding (or postulating) a “hidden” (i.e., unpronounced or covert) 
indexical associated with the expression(s) we hear pronounced.”35 Being neutral about this 
for the explanation of a neutral proposition is in this connection not to go into such 
considerations. 
 Point (III) is already introduced as a central matter. In being neutral about whether 
sentences are propositional or sub-propositional one might think that this could solve the 
present dispute about semantic content.  
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 Point (IV), I interpret to suggest neutrality about whether the same content is what is said 
by an utterance or if it is the declarative content of a sentence. The concept of what is said is 
traditionally richer on content than declarative sentences and the way the notion assertive 
content is used in Cappelen and Lepore’s book is synonymous with declarative content.  
 The assumed way to read this neutrality is to think that the declarative content of sentences 
also may be what is said and even also what is meant by the use of a sentence. On the other 
hand it may also be true that the declarative content is not what is said or meant by a sentence 
and a theory may be neutral on this issue in not considering this question.  
 Another worry is that declarative sentences used as examples offer too little scope for a 
semantic theory. In this connection I will propose that assertions
36
, questions, declarations, 
directives etc. have declarative content which is possible recoverable without context. For 
instance take a written question: what makes it a question is first and foremost because there 
is a question mark. Whether or not we have to judge this as a genuine speech-act will depend 
on the theory. Carsten Hansen at IFIKK and CSMN in Oslo was suggesting something similar 
a few years back; he proposed that ’telling’ is a (general) speech-act. On this picture one may 
assert: what ever you do with a sentence or speech-act, you are telling something. So any 
relatively meaningful sentence can be judged to be a speech-act.    
 So on this background we may ask whether the assumed context independent declarative 
sentences must be taken to be speech-acts or not. Another question is whether Semantic 
Minimalism really is a theory about linguistically determinable declarative speech-acts. 
 The three points of neutrality can be viewed as help for the understanding of theoretical 
neutrality. This view on what a semantic theory may look like with minimally loaded 
theoretical issues should make us see more clearly that the debate concerning the 
semantic/pragmatic distinction not so much is a terminological debate as it is a debate about 
theoretical frameworks. In adding theoretical problems to be solved, one increases the 
explanatory burden. So we might want to only take into account the problems that necessarily 
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must be solved. The points of neutrality are excluding a lot of theoretical framework and 
restrictions on the theories. This makes the semantic/pragmatic distinction less problematic, 
but arguably more unclear. 
 Carston’s LEM is in her article ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics 
Distinction’, not given much explanation, so her motivation for writing this article seems to 
be to show that the Semantic Minimalist and the Moderate Contextualist and in particular 
Bach’s theory are blurring the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Another more 
hidden agenda seems to be to argue for the distinction given in option (5), and in general to 
persuade the reader to get an interest for contextualism. Her claim that it is somewhat ironic 
that it is the contextualist who has the most minimal proposition as sub-propositional may not 
be so important for what is at issue in the debate between the contextualist and the semantic 
minimalist. Instead the question may turn out to be what theoretical issues a semantic theory 
should account for.     
 Cappelen and Lepore’s theory in general has so many neutrality theses, that it is probably 
their theory that really is the most neutral. This may partly be because it is meant to be a 
foundation for further theorizing and because the presented views are what Cappelen and 
Lepore agree on.  
 Generally, I think that the less is explained, the easier it is to think that there is a pure 
linguistic or semantic level. The minimal semanticists’ plea for simplicity and shallowness 
can be seen as being in a tension between what a theory should account for and what really is 
belonging to the area of semantic theorizing.  
 
 
 
 
2.3. Introductory Notes on Indexicals and Context 
 
The way Cappelen presents the four points quoted above is slightly different from how I use 
them. Cappelen presentation can be read as special reading of Kaplan’s theory. The intention 
is I think to make the reader of the book have this in mind when he or she reads the critical 
views on Cappelen and Lepore’s book Insensitive Semantics. The view presented by Cappelen 
is compared to Cappelen and Lepore’s view, closer to Moderate Contextualism, and in 
particular it is closer to the view presented by Bach. This is mainly because of his positive 
view on Kaplan’s notion ‘character’ which is also endorsed by Bach. Still, there might be an 
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important difference which at least is evident from how Carston presents Bach’s view on pure 
indexicals. Cappelen:  
 
Note that while the character of an expression is part of its linguistic meaning, it does not 
enter into specification of its semantic content. Characters determine semantic contents; 
they are not constituents of semantic contents. The semantic content of, for example, an 
utterance by A at a time t and location l of “I’m here now” is the proposition that A is at l at 
t. The constituents of this proposition are determined by the character of the corresponding 
lexical elements, but this proposition doesn’t in any way “contain” these rules.37 
 
The most important difference from Bach’s approach is how this is applied. The idea is the 
same, but it might be differences in what is seen as contained in the proposition. Cappelen’s 
use of the notion ‘proposition’ is in this connection however problematic because his 
application of Kaplan’s framework is presented as neutral to the question of propositionality.    
 The strategy Carston exploits in her article, ‘Linguistic Communication and the 
Semantic/Pragmatics Distinction’, is to show that her notion of 'semantics' is more minimal 
than proposed by the other theories. This comes generally with a view that undermines 
propositionalism on the semantic level (as the combination of option (3) and (4) proposes 
which is presented as Cappelen and Lepore’s view), but also a denial of option (2) which is 
taken to be Bach's position, which is a non-propositional view. Carston's view is also non-
propositional and Carston and Bach share the view of sub-propositionality. The sub-
propositional views are presented as little different, where Bach is including pure-indexicals 
as a purely semantic matter. This is often explained by the use of the pure indexical 'I', which 
is seen as determinable without real contextual aspects. Instead it is proposed that there is a 
determinable rule (or rules), like for instance: “'I' refers to the speaker”38 Bach explains: 
 
The reference of a pure indexical is determined by its linguistic meaning as a function of a 
contextual variable (call that the semantic context). However, the reference of other 
indexicals and of demonstratives is not so determined. They suffer from a character 
deficiency. For them the role of context is not to determine reference, in the sense of 
constituting it, but to enable the listener to determine it, in the sense of ascertaining. But 
this is cognitive, not semantic context. Their reference is a matter of the speaker's 
communicative intention, which is not just another contextual variable. In fact, rather than 
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  Cappelen, Herman. 2007. ‘Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues.’ , 5. 
38
  The idea of pure-indexicals and their special role, can be found in Kaplan’s paper Demonstratives. 
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describing them as referring, it would be better to describe speakers as using them to 
refer.
39
 
 
Other pure indexicals are 'today', 'tomorrow', 'actual', 'present' and (perhaps) 'here' and 'now'. 
Now, if there is an agreement between Carston and Bach that the semantic level has to be seen 
as non-propositional and sub-propositional, how can there be a disagreement about what 
counts as the semantic level? One possible answer is that they disagree about how the 
semantic level has to be seen as non-propositional and sub-propositional, but this might not 
necessarily affect what counts as semantics. Bach:  
 
The fact that a sentence is semantically incomplete or underdeterminate does not mean that 
it is semantically defective. Yes, it does have a character deficiency, but still it has a definite 
content (or contents, if it is ambiguous), as given compositionally by the semantics. There 
is no empirical or theoretical reason why, at the level of semantics, the content of the 
sentence has to be supplemented or refined.
40
  
 
As presented in Carston's paper, the difference is that Bach is seen as adding something to the 
semantic level when he says that pure-indexicals have determinate rules. This is a minor 
difference. The general disagreement is more extensive and this relates to some fundamental 
issues about encoding, processing and how they see the pragmatic story.
41
 Bach’s distinction 
between narrow context and “wide context” (context which lends support to intentions and 
other contextual features) is by Carston explained as follows: 
 
Bach distinguishes the notion of “narrow context”, which plays a role in semantics, from 
contextual information in the broad sense, which is anything the hearer takes into account, 
in accordance with pragmatic maxims/principles, in reaching the intended interpretation of 
the utterance. “Narrow” context consists of a small, well-defined set of objective 
parameters, including, and perhaps exhausted by, the speaker, the addressee, the time, the 
day and the place of utterance.
42
 
 
Carston argues against determination of the pure-indexical 'I' at the semantic level, and the 
argumentation is in general against narrow context: 
 
                                                 
39
  Bach, Kent. 2004.’ Minding the Gap. The Semantic-Pragmatic Gap.’, 36. 
40
  Bach, Kent. 2004. ‘Minding the Gap. The Semantic-Pragmatic Gap.’, 38. 
41
  One important issue is that Carston holds that there are encoded expressions at the linguistic level, while 
Bach thinks that inference goes all the way down to and through the linguistic level.  
42
  Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and Utterances. ‘The Explicit/Implicit Distinction.’, 178.  
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[…] narrow context as standardly construed does not give the right result for a whole host 
of utterances involving pure-indexicals. Consider, for example a post-it note, which says 
'I'll miss my office hour today', written by a departmental secretary sitting in her office one 
evening, who then attaches it to an absent professor's office door the next morning; clearly, 
the correct referent of 'I' and 'my' is not the writer of the note but the professor, and the 
correct referent of 'today' is not the day on which the note was written but the day on which 
it appears on the professor’s door.43  
 
As we see, Carston argues from wide context for the explanation of how communication can 
be done. Narrow context is to be understood as the same as 'linguistic meaning as a function 
of a contextual variable (call that the semantic context)'. Semantic-context as proposed by 
Bach is for Carston not a semantic matter, but a pragmatic matter.  
 I think of course that there are fundamental problems concerning the determinability of 
pure-indexicals, but I think Carston's argument above is questionable. The meaning of pure 
indexicals involves referring, and the function of a referring-expression is to refer. This 
conception is needed for the purpose of stating that pure indexicals and also names have 
meaning at all. So, some kind of extension for the explanation of how such expressions 
function is I think needed. Still, Carston’s argument is not against the above description, but 
against the possibility of actually determining an actual referent with the help of narrow 
context. So how should Bach’s statement: “The reference of a pure indexical is determined by 
its linguistic meaning as a function of a contextual variable (call that the semantic context)”44 
be interpreted? A weak interpretation may be that there are rules connected to pure indexicals 
which make them differ in some respect from other indexicals and demonstratives.  
 I think it is right that they differ in some fundamental respect. A demonstrative like ‘that’ 
can point or refer to anything, while a pure indexical like ‘I’ is pointing or referring to an 
individual subject. What we are able to “minimally think” when such expressions are used is 
that the user of ‘I’ is referring to himself and that the user of ‘that’ is pointing or referring to 
something. The pure indexicals is arguably interpretable as more determinable than the 
demonstratives or other indexicals. This is at this point not meant to be an argument against 
Carston’s objection, but only as an indication of correctness concerning the separation of 
different interpretative strength concerning pure indexicals and other indexicals and 
demonstratives. Carston’s objection is pointed directly at the explicated rule “’I’ refers to the 
speaker”, and more indirectly at the conception of narrow context. What I think the objection 
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shows, is that in her view, indexicals has to be determined by wide context and this invites the 
“whole” pragmatic apparatus. I think it is a middle ground here somewhere, and that this is 
introduced by the expressions themselves. A rule like “’I’ refers to the speaker” can be viewed 
to be over-specified, but will be a rule or a conception which is manifest whenever a speaker 
use ‘I’ to refer to himself or herself.  
 Whether or not an intention is involved for the determination of the expression is a central 
issue of disagreement. This is arguably not needed for an explanation of what the meaning of 
linguistic items are, but maybe always needed for how language in general is used. What we 
take to be the semantic value of an expression seems to be the problem, and an assumption is 
that we need only some information about the function of the expressions for the explanation 
of the semantics. Some (and almost all) seem to think that we need actual referents for the 
determination of the meaning of indexical and demonstrative expressions. 
 Whether or not a Semantic Minimalist should go into such considerations, may be an open 
question, and Cappelen and Lepore seem to be quite open considering how to treat indexicals 
and demonstratives. In their book Insensitive Semantics, Recanati is represented as not 
distinguishing between pure indexicals and other indexicals and demonstratives, because he 
thinks that wide context and speaker’s intention are involved in both cases: 
 
We encounter the same sort of problem even with expressions like ‘here’ and ‘now’ which 
are traditionally considered as pure indexicals (rather than demonstratives). Their semantic 
value is the time or place of the context respectively. But what counts as the time and place 
of the context? How inclusive must the time or place in question be? It depends on what the 
speaker means, hence, again, on the wide context. (Recanati 2004, p. 68)
45
 
 
And this is their response: 
 
These are insights that we might agree with, i.e., we might agree that the semantic value of 
semantically context sensitive expressions might be fixed by the intentions of the speaker. 
We don’t (need to) assume that the semantic value is fixed by purely “objective” features of 
the context of utterance. Our view need not take a stand on the question of the exact nature 
of these reference fixing mechanisms, but as far as we can tell, Recanati is probably right: 
wide context is involved. (At least we would be willing to concede that for the sake of 
argument.)
46
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  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics, 147 – 148. 
46
  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics, 147. 
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What Cappelen and Lepore are willing to concede seems to be that indexicals and 
demonstratives are irreducible and that without wide context and intention they cannot be 
determined, so in this respect, in agreement with Recanati’s and Carston’s theory. But by 
stating that they don’t need to take a stand on these issues, we seem to be left with the 
assumption that such expressions must be determined in privileged ways: “Semantic 
Minimalism recognizes a small subset of expressions that interact with context of utterance in 
privileged ways; we call these the genuinely context sensitive expressions.”47 In not going into 
detail about this, a whole lot of considerations are left open. What may seem a bit strange is 
that names are not seen in need of reference assignment for the determination of their 
semantic value, while the indexicals are seen in need of reference assignment.  
 
 
 
 
2.4. General Considerations and Some More Notes on Word Meaning. 
  
What may be most important for Cappelen and Lepore’s approach in general is to make a 
preliminary framework for further theorizing and frame a clear methodology for how to 
distinguish between context-sensitive and context-insensitive expressions and of course to 
undermine Contextualism in general. The preliminary approach for further theorizing can be 
seen as a methodology which can be mapped on different theories: 
 
In order to fix or determine the proposition semantically expressed by an utterance of a 
sentence S, follow steps (a) – (e): 
(a) Specify the meaning (or semantic value) of every expression in S (doing so in 
accordance with your favorite semantic theory, i.e., we want Semantic Minimalism to 
be neutral between the different accounts of how best to assign semantic values to 
linguistic expressions; e.g., objects, sets, properties, functions, conceptual roles, 
stereotypes, or whatever). 
(b) Specify all the relevant compositional meaning rules for English (doing so also in 
accordance with your favorite semantic theory; again, we insist upon Semantic 
Minimalism being neutral between different accounts of how best to respect 
compositionality). 
(c) Disambiguate every ambiguous/polysemous expression in S. 
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(d) Precisify every vague expression in S.48 
 
The rather open view on semantic theorizing presented above, is I think not consistent or only 
consistent to some extent with other views presented in their book, but is still showing us how 
it can be used for further theorizing.  
 Ambiguous or polysemous expressions are not present on their list of genuinely context-
sensitive expressions so the disambiguation must probably be done on the basis of 
compositionality or just by decision.
49
  
 The proponents of narrow context (or semantic context) are by Cappelen and Lepore 
named 'Moderate Contextualists' and Bach is seen as belonging to this group. Carston is 
presented as a Moderate and a Radical Contextualist.
50
 Radical Contextualists are those who 
argue for and from wide context, but maybe more importantly (at least for the present 
purposes) those theorists who “[...] hold some version or other of the view that every single 
expression is context-sensitive”51 From a wide context perspective, the possibility that every 
single expression is context-sensitive is highly present, but this seems to be under the 
assumption that speech acts are context-sensitive in general, and this no-one disagrees about. 
However, Carston seem to hold the view that every single expression is (possibly) context-
sensitive. Still, she holds that there is a level of linguistic or semantic meaning which is 
context invariant all over which underpins further pragmatic enrichment. The all clear 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics then, should tell us that there is something 
determinable about any expression, even indexicals and demonstratives. So when Carston is 
claiming that the semantic level is determinable, it may be a mystery what is left when all the 
pragmatics is pealed of. This is especially interesting in connection with the indexicals and 
demonstratives, but is interesting in connection with other expressions as well. 
 In Thoughts and Utterances she writes:  
 
According to the relevance-theoretic view, an atomic concept consists of an address or node 
in memory which may make available three kinds of information: logical content, 
encyclopedic or general knowledge, and lexical properties. Each of these kinds of 
information has its own format. The logical entry consists of a set of inference rules, or 
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  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics, 145. 
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expression in a sentence,  it will pass the disqutational indirect report test (which will be presented later), and 
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50
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  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie: 2005. Insensitive Semantics, 5. 
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“meaning postulates”, which capture certain analytic implications of the concept, generally 
falling short of anything definitional.
52
 
53
 
 
What this quote seems to indicate is a complexity within decoding with an indication of stages 
or levels within decoding. The latter sentence may be interpreted as saying that she doesn’t 
think it is a determinable level of content on the linguistic level. This is so because the 
inference rules or meaning postulates are seen as generally falling short of anything 
definitional. This view will render the whole linguistic level indeterminate and every 
expression must be seen as indicating some sort of indexicality. 
 Another general assumption is that any expression might be in need of adjustment – lexical 
narrowing or broadening
54
 or other conceptions that shows that the content of expressions 
changes. The general idea is presented as the idea of ad hoc concepts and in this connection 
the view is that it is a determinable level of linguistic content and the lexical narrowing or 
broadening is “done” by pragmatics: 
 
The basic characteristic of an ad hoc concept is that it is accessed in a particular context 
by a spontaneous process of pragmatic inference, as distinct from a concept which is 
accessed by the process of lexical decoding and so is context-invariant (that is, one that 
comprises the standing meaning of the word in the linguistic system). So, for instance, a 
speaker may use the word ‘happy’ in a particular context to communicate a concept 
which, although not encoded by the lexical form, is an established component of the 
hearer’s conceptual repertoire, one that features as a constituent of certain of his 
thoughts.
55
 
 
So the general assumption is that Carston thinks that all expressions have determinable 
meanings which are decodable to some extent or degree, but the point that all expressions can 
be attributed stable meanings independent of pragmatic input seems to be needed for the 
semantic/pragmatic distinction Carston argues for: 
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What does seem clear is that all these various pragmatic contributions can be distinguished 
from the meaning contributed by the linguistic expression itself used by Sue in (6), that is, 
the meaning that the words ‘she’, ‘enough’, ‘units’, ‘and’, ‘continue’, etc. have as elements 
in a particular linguistic system (the meaning which is logged for them in the mental 
lexicon), together with the relations between these meanings imposed by the particular 
syntactic structure of the sentence. This gives us the distinction in (1): it can be seen as a 
distinction between the information/meaning that comes from (is encoded by) the linguistic 
form used by the speaker (LEM) and the nonlinguistic information/meaning required for a 
complete understanding of the speaker’s meaning. Alternatively to, or parallel with, this 
informational construal, it can be seen as a distinction between psychological processes: the 
decoding processes by which an addressee recovers LEM and the inferential processes by 
which he extends and adjusts it in order to recover what the speaker meant. This latter 
distinction is central in the Relevance theory approach to communication and 
comprehension (see Sperber & Wilson 1986/95).
56
 
 
The node or the entry introduced in the quote before this quote is the starting point for further 
decoding and pragmatic inference. This is thought to be within the cognitive apparatus of an 
individual subject. LEM is of course the material that is interpreted, so the idea is that there is 
purely linguistic information/meaning which is encoded and encoded only. The encoded word 
meanings in a sentence are then seen as related to each other compositionally by the syntactic 
structure of the sentence.  
 It seems possible to think that this alone, without pragmatic contribution or non-linguistic 
information, sometimes is enough to change the value of an expression. So it may be right 
that there still is a question whether the narrowing/ broadening thesis can operate with atomic 
concepts at the bottom of the theory. Another interesting question is what counts as 
compositionality and how this can be separated from what we take to be contextual import.   
 Consider the sentence: 
 
1. Jane is old, she is 29 years old. 
 
Arguably it seems possible to state that the two occurrences of 'old' have to be interpreted 
differently even if we just consider the decoding of the expression and the compositionality of 
the sentence. We don't seem to need a (particular) context to state that the meaning of 'old' in 
'Jane is old' introduces a concept that indicates comparison to something (introduces a 
parameter) and that the 'old' in 'she is 29 years old' is neutral, only indicating having age. 
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Another way to explain this is that the 'old' that introduces a parameter, is in a complementary 
relation to the word 'young' and that this is not the case with the neutral ‘old’. The address or 
node might however be the same, because there seems to be something minimal mutually 
shared by the two instances of 'old'. So, a question that arises can be, -what is the primary 
meaning of old? I will not choose one of them as primary, but it might be tempting to choose 
the neutral one, for the purpose of theoretical simplicity. The node itself or the unrelated 
expression 'old', might be seen as neutral to such considerations, so we might think that the 
question arises at a second level.
57
 So it may be that the decoding starts with the node or the 
expression on a first level, and ends as decoded on a second level. If we take the somewhat 
neutral 'old' to be primary, we may consider the 'old' which comes with a parameter to be 
pragmatically adjusted. But the “problem” with this view, seems to be that we don't need a 
particular context for the determination of any of the instances of 'old' in the sentence. What I 
think is evident, is that we need more than the node or the expression for a determinate level 
of linguistic or semantic meaning, if the node or the expression is lesser than one of the 
semantic meanings of 'old'. So the expression 'old' on a context independent semantic level 
may have to be viewed as indeterminate, but might be viewed as determinate if we think that 
compositionality is enough to determinate the two different meanings of 'old'.  
 Now, sentences do seem to introduce contextual information without necessarily the 
introduction of the respective context. So how can we separate between compositionality and 
context? Let's cut the sentence above and make two sentences: 
 
2. Jane is old. 
3. Jane is 29 years old.  
 
It is evidently not the meaning of sentence (2) to only indicate that Jane has age, and it is not 
the meaning of sentence (3) to indicate that Jane has an age of 29 compared to anything else 
than being 29 years old. This can arguably be asserted as determined by the meaning of the 
expressions and the differences in compositionality only, but the differences in 
compositionality and the meanings of the expressions do seem to introduce or relate to 
information that is contextual. 
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 So, it may be that the level of semantic content cannot be purely semantic because there is 
something present which is only recognizable by intuition and/or inference in connection with 
the use of the expressions. Now, I think there are some unsolved questions concerning how 
these issues should be solved, but Carston has a solution and this is to move the appropriate 
domain for semantics to a language of thought. The “linguistic” content of a thought is the 
mental representation that comprises that thought. On Carston’s view this is genuinely truth-
conditional content, i.e., propositional content: 
 
Now, let's think about semantics without pragmatics, the appropriate domain for this being 
thought. Unlike natural language sentences and phrases, employed in acts of ostensive 
communication, it seems reasonable to assume that the mental representations that 
comprise thoughts are (by and large) semantically complete, that is propositional, hence 
evaluable as true or false of states of affairs they represent. It doesn’t make any sense to 
distinguish between a minimal and a pragmatically completed or enriched proposition with 
regard to a thought, (as opposed to a verbal utterance), since, for any case of differences in 
propositional form we simply have different thoughts. Jerry Fodor puts this in an especially 
strong way: 'Whereas the content of a sentence may be [and often is] inexplicit with respect 
to the content of the thought it expresses, a thought can't be inexplicit with respect to the 
content of the thought it expresses, a thought can’t be inexplicit with respect to its own 
content; there can’t be more – or less – to a thought than there is to its content because a 
thought just is its content” (Fodor 2001, 14). Having a thought is a strikingly different kind 
of mental activity from comprehending an utterance: we do not have to undergo a process 
of comprehending occurrences (tokenings) of our own thoughts; we may go on to derive 
implications (further thoughts) from a thought, but grasping the thought itself does not go 
beyond the occurrence of it […]58 
 
A lot of problems can be seen as solved on this conception of semantics. This is evidently 
because there is no need to consider any sense of interpretation. So there is a 
semantic/pragmatic distinction within thought, where at least in a lot of cases, reference 
assignment, ambiguity, indexicality etc. are seen as solved simply by being a mental 
representation that are mapped on a certain environment of non-linguistic information in the 
abductive domain of a thought. The idea is still that the semantics of the thought is distinct 
from the non-linguistic information. Fodors conception (and others) of a language of thought 
is often presented as the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH). We will come back to this 
issue.  
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2.5. Further Considerations on Word Meaning, Context Sensitivity and Context In-
sensitivity 
 
Bach's different views and conceptual separation between pure-indexicals and other 
indexicals and demonstratives should make it evident that he sees all the other expressions 
which are not among what he takes to be on his list of contexts sensitive expressions, as 
determinate expressions on the semantic level. So, the pure-indexicals and all the other 
expressions that are not suffering any character deficiency on the semantic level are seen as 
having definite determinable content. Still, any sentence which is semantically incomplete or 
underdeterminate is seen as defective, because it is in need of supplementation and this 
supplementation is a seen as a pragmatic matter. So, deficiency is seen as having two distinct 
origins, -semantic deficiency and pragmatic deficiency.   
 Carston's complain about Bach's inclusion of pure indexicals as stable minimal word 
meanings may seem to be on the right track, and this is because it is hard to assume objective 
context. Carston and Cappelen and Lepore can be seen as teaming up against Bach on this 
particular point. The following test is meant to prove that context-sensitive expressions block 
inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports: 
 
Real context sensitive expressions block Inter-Contextual Disquotational* Indirect Reports. 
By definition, for e to be context sensitive is for e to shift its semantic value from one 
context of utterance to another. So, if e is context sensitive and Rupert uses e in context C, 
and Lepore uses it in context C´, and the relevant contextual features change, then it will be 
just an accident if their uses of e end up with the same semantic value. In particular, if 
Lepore finds himself in a context other than Rupert’s and wants to utter a sentence that 
matches the semantic content of Rupert’s utterance of a sentence with e, he can’t use e i.e., 
he can’t report Rupert’s utterance disquotationally.  
 All the expressions in the Basic Set block Inter-Contextual Disquotational Indirect 
Reports.
59
  
 
The inter-contextual disquotational indirect report test is meant to show that all the 
expressions on the list of genuinely context-sensitive expressions are context-sensitive 
expressions. These expressions are more or less the same as the ones on Kaplan's list in his 
paper ‘Demonstratives’: 
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Slightly elaborated, his list goes like this: The personal pronouns 'I', 'you,' 'he,' 'she', 'it,' in 
their various cases and number (e.g., singular, plural, nominative, accusative, genitive 
forms), the demonstrative pronouns 'that' and 'this' in their various cases and number, the 
adverbs 'here,' 'there,' 'now,' 'today,' 'yesterday,' 'tomorrow,' 'ago,' (as in 'He left two days 
ago'), 'hence(forth)' (as in 'There will be no talking henceforth), and the adjectives 'actual' 
and 'present' (Kaplan 1989a, p. 489). Words and aspects of words that indicate tense also 
have their reference so determined. And there are also the contextuals, which include 
common nouns like 'enemy,' 'outsider,' 'foreigner,' 'alien,' 'immigrant,' 'friend,' and 'native' as 
well as common adjectives like 'foreign,' 'local', 'domestic,' 'national,' 'imported,' and 
'exported' (cf., Vallée 2003): Nunberg 1992; Condoravdi and Gawron 1995; Partee 1989).
60 
 
The above presentation can be viewed as if Cappelen and Lepore are holding an Expression-
type Contextualist view. They don't want to be Contextualists, but they see the need for being 
so when there are genuinely context-sensitive expressions present in sentences.  
 Bach's inclusion of pure-indexicals to his list of determinable expressions without context 
makes him somewhat less of a Contextualist compared to Cappelen and Lepore concerning 
pure-indexicals only.  
 In a handout used by Bach in Kingston 11-13 September 09 called ‘Why not 
Contextualism’61 he presents a list of context-dependent expressions. This list includes 
(possibly) less obvious context-dependent expressions than the expressions presented on 
Cappelen and Lepore's list. This is for instance gradable adjectives, like 'tall,' 'old,' and 'fast,' 
etc. This point makes him more of a Contextualist compared to Cappelen and Lepore. 
 In the article ‘A Tall Tale’ and in their book Insensitive Semantics, Cappelen and Lepore 
argue for minimal conceptual interpretation of such expressions without the need for appeal to 
context and/or parametrical conceptions. This seems important for their approach, and I think 
it gives a good explanation for how Minimalism can be done. The distinction between sub-
propositionalism and propositionalism is in this light given a clear conception. 
 This is a minimal presentation of Cappelen and Lepore's position: 
 
The semantic content of a sentence S is the content that all utterances of S share. It is the 
content that all utterances of S express no matter how different their contexts of utterance 
are. It is also the content that can be grasped and reported by someone who is ignorant 
about the relevant characteristics of the context in which an utterance of S took place. 
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  Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie. 2005. Insensitive Semantics, 1. 
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  Bach, Kent: 2009. ‘Why Not Contextualism’. Handout: Kingston, On Contextualism Workshop, 11-13 Sep. 
09. 
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  The minimal proposition cannot be characterized completely independently of the 
context of utterance. Semantic Minimalism recognizes a small subset of expressions that 
interact with context of utterance in privileged ways; we call these the genuinely context 
sensitive expressions.
62
 
 
As already mentioned, I think it is possible to see their position as operating with both 
propositions and sub-propositions on the semantic level. The first part of the quote as 
explaining what it takes for a sentence to be a proposition and the second part as explaining 
when sentences must be seen as sub-propositional (when only considering linguistic 
meaning). This is however not how Cappelen and Lepore present their theory; this is because 
they see the expressions which interact with context as determinable by context and their 
main aim is to explain propositionality.  
 As argumentation for minimal propositions and Semantic Minimalism in general, 
declarative sentences containing expressions like 'tall,' 'old etc, are used as paradigm cases. A 
central response to objections to their central view is that all that is necessary is a truth 
condition and that sentences can be seen as expressing the same content in different contexts.  
 So when we have a sentence like 'Victoria is neither young or old', this sentence is seen as 
expressing the content that Victoria is neither young or old and is true just in case Victoria is 
neither young or old.  
 A Contextualist needs a context. For the name 'Victoria' this could be a person or 
something else, like for instance a type of a car; types of Ford made in the thirties and the 
fifties and such cars are usually thought to be old. There are also rules that state that they are, 
which makes one get away with smaller insurance bills and one doesn't have to pay road-tax 
(at least in Norway). However, at this point I'll leave such considerations for the purpose of 
making evident that we don't have access to the context of utterance in which the sentence is 
used. So, we don't have the referent of the name 'Victoria' and we don't have real contextual 
parameters that can tell us what is meant by 'is neither young or old'.  
 In such cases, the Contextualist argues that there is no truth-conditional content that can be 
evaluated. This is because the sentence is seen as underdetermined and because of this has to 
be viewed to be a sub-proposition. The Semantic Minimalist is only obliged to determine the 
meaning of the sentence and see this in the perspective of a truth-condition. Again: the 
sentence is what's on the left side of the truth-condition and the perspectival content or meta-
representation is the content on the right side:  
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 'Victoria is neither young or old' is true if and only if Victoria is neither young or old. 
Let’s do some pragmatic possible world semantics: the temptation to judge this sentence as 
false seems to be strong and is dependent on what the truth-condition is related to. The 
problem seems to be that Victoria is presented as having existence without the predicate 
'having age', i.e., 'is neither young or old'. This will render the proposition false in every 
possible world. Arguably if the proposition can be judged as false in every possible (real) 
world, then the proposition is truth-evaluable and can be seen as expressing a determinate 
content.  
 An objection to this might be that the proposition can't be seen as truth-evaluable because 
it can be judged as neither true nor false. This is because nothing can have existence and at 
the same time no age. This is similar to the point above, but with another outcome which 
asserts that the sentence is meaningless, i.e., not expressing content that could have been true 
or false.  
 Let's put truth-conditions aside for the moment, and again look at Cappelen and Lepore's 
disquotational indirect speech reports.
63
 A disquotational indirect speech report is seen as true 
if it is indirectly reportable by a person unaware of the context in which it is uttered (or any 
other context). So the idea is that a sentence like ‘Victoria is neither young or old’ is indirectly 
reportable if it doesn't contain any expressions that are context-sensitive. A form will typically 
be: 'Hannah said that Victoria is neither young or old'. The sentence is true as a report made 
by another person, so we will get the form: ‘It is true that Aristotle said that Hannah said that 
Victoria is neither young or old'. This conception may show that Cappelen and Lepore's 
theory doesn't need truth-conditionality if this is enough for an account of genuine 
propositionality. Still, if it is indirectly reportable it should also be truth-evaluable.  
 One reason for my choice of the above sentence is to show that it is even more plausible 
that it is disquotationally reportable than if we have a sentence like 'Victoria is old'. This is 
because the negation of 'young and old' can be seen as neutralizing any potential parameters. 
In comparison, the sentence 'Victoria is old' can (intuitively) be seen as introducing a 
parameter, because without it, it seems possible to interpret it as meaning only ‘having age’.  
 This is evidently the meaning ‘old’ is attributed in a sentence like ‘Victoria is 29 years old’. 
Arguably there are no parameters involved when ‘old’ is used in such a sentence or the 
parameter is given in the sentence as the age of Victoria being 29 year. The contrast between 
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 ___________________________________________ The Semantic/Pragmatic Distinction 39 
 
the two slightly different meanings of old in the sentences ‘Victoria is old’ and ‘Victoria is 29 
years old’ is evidently present, but there is still a question whether this has to be seen as a 
matter of context dependency or not. As we saw, it may be possible to see this as a matter of 
compositionality and linguistic meaning only. This may be so because we need different 
sentences to mark this difference.  
 Further, ‘old’ can be judged to be ambiguous64 between the two uses, but it is not 
ambiguous in the same manner as for instance ‘bank’, meaning either ‘financial institution’ or 
‘edge of a river’. This is because ‘bank’ has completely different lexical definitions, and this 
is evidently not the case with ‘old’ because it can be seen as the concept is the same but that it 
has different secondary concepts related to the primary concept - one with a parameter and 
another (perhaps) without a parameter, and more generally, one with an extension and another 
without an extension. Another difference is that ‘bank’ is ambiguous when the same sentence 
is used, i.e. in ‘He went to the bank’. There is no pointer that indicates what kind of bank he 
went to. In contrast, it can arguably be interpreted from the sentences how we should read the 
meaning of ‘old’ and we don’t seem to need a context in order to understand this. 
 A Contextualist will assert that ‘old’ is a context dependent expression. Cappelen and 
Lepore are the theorists who most clearly don’t think that it is context dependent, (at least 
among the present theorists). Such phenomenon’s like ambiguity, syntactic ellipses, 
polysemy, nonliterality and vagueness is on their view thought to be irrelevant factors for the 
assertion that expressions and sentences is context-sensitive.
65
 If for instance it is thought to 
be a problem concerning ambiguity, they simply say disambiguate every ambiguous 
expression and if it is supposed by someone that there is a parameter involved they can assert 
that however that may be, it is not relevant for the semantic meaning of such expressions. 
About this latter suggestion it is still a question whether the general parametrical function of 
words like ‘old’ and ‘tall’ already is part of the semantic meaning of the word meaning 
simpliciter.  
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 In particular contexts there might be uses of 'old' that indicate something else than age, like 
matureness or other. The sentence 'Victoria is old' can in such a context indicate something 
like Victoria is mature for her age, but this will be an implicature.
66
 This is something which 
clearly falls outside the realm of Semantic Minimalism and is the main target for criticism 
when Contextualism is considered. So this is a clear difference in what the different 
approaches can and are willing to account for. The Contextualists will say that the Semantic 
Minimalist looses something essential by their unwillingness concerning pragmatic 
theorizing. 
 As noted in the introduction, Carston has a point that makes the disagreement between the 
Contextualist and the Semantic Minimalist seem somewhat harmless: “[...] once we recognize 
that what the Contextualist is focusing on is this pragmatic notion of what is said (that is, the 
truth-conditional content of an utterance or speech act) as distinct from a formal 'pure' level 
of linguistic semantics, much of the fire goes out of the minimalist/contextualist debate.”67 I 
think Carston slightly are changing her critical view on formal semantics, and becomes less 
critical than the impression one gets after reading Thoughts and Utterances. Still, her interest 
in minimal propositions is quite minimal, and her minimal sub-proposition seems to be just a 
tool and not the goal of her investigations: 
 
I think we would all agree that a crucial ingredient in figuring out what the speaker means 
by a verbal utterance is the linguistically determined input, but I would claim that this is 
precisely what LEM gives us. Now, it could be objected that LEM alone cannot be an input 
to this interpretive process because it is not fully propositional and so is not the right kind 
of entity to serve as a premise in inference; what we need is something which is at least 
minimally propositional.
68
    
 
Carston can be interpreted as slightly opening up for the possibility that the Semantic 
Minimalists’ minimal-proposition is a conceptual device better suited as a premise in 
inference for figuring out what the speaker means. Still she holds that LEM is sub-
propositional.  
 One may ask what a linguistically determined input amounts to: if it is determined, why 
not see it as a genuine semantic proposition at the semantic level?  
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seems to be traceable in connection with this example. Evidently, the content of the implicature is not a 
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  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Review Minimal Semantics by Emma Borg.’, 361. 
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  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction.’,  13. 
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 The sentence 'Victoria is neither young or old' will on Carston's view be taken to be under-
determinate. The right proposition or thought and communicated content may in this case be 
that 'Victoria is feeling neither young or old'. The “parameter” for 'feeling neither young or 
old' is the feeling which amounts to how it is to feel neither young or old. This may have 
something to do with the age of Victoria or it may be independent of this. Some 
Contextualists is concerned about such things and there may be differences among them 
concerning the limits of investigations they take into account for the explanation of what 
communicated content amounts to.    
 Cappelen and Lepore complain about the Contextualists’ tendencies of going into 
metaphysical speculations. This is for instance presented in connection with “the metaphysics 
of tallness” and what is left of 'tall' on their view is 'tall' simpliciter or simply tall without any 
parameters. Still it may seem right that the semantic meaning of 'tall' comes with parametrical 
considerations as opposed to shortness, i.e., it may be right to explain the semantics for 'tall' 
with some explanation or definite description of tallness as indicating a degree of height or a 
degree of height measured as higher than something else.  
 Borg does take into concern that comparative adjectives semantically indicate that there is 
parametrical considerations. Borg's parametrical considerations are general, i.e., that 'tall' has 
some comparison class compared to something. So the main difference is that Borg's theory 
operates with extensions, while Cappelen and Lepore do see a point in avoiding them. Still 
they agree on the following and Cappelen’s neutrality point II can be seen as operative in this 
quote:  
 
So, if I know that you said 'Jill is tall' but I don't know what comparison class you had in 
mind, I can nevertheless report you as having said that Jill is tall (i.e. I can report you using 
the minimal proposition expressed by your sentence). I can do so because, even if I don't 
know much about the context, I know what your words meant.
69
 
 
I do not think it is clear what a word meaning for ‘tall’ simpliciter amount to. Cappelen and 
Lepore take it to be context-insensitive and disquotationally indirectly reportable. Borg’s 
theory does agree with this but adds an extension for the explanation of such words because 
she sees the need for an explanation of the general parametrical function of such words. 
Whether or not the size of the proposition containing such words is larger or the same as in 
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Cappelen and Lepore’s theory may be an open question. The difference may rather contain in 
the point that Cappelen and Lepore’s shallow view do not see the importance for such 
explanations. What I think is right in this connection is that Cappelen and Lepore’s theory 
more clearly not are introducing context for the explanation of the semantic content of 
sentences contain such expressions. We will come back to this issue later.    
 It seems right that the size of a sub-proposition or proposition can be the same and that the 
only difference is that the same-sized sub-proposition or proposition is seen as either an 
incomplete proposition or a full or genuine proposition. In Carston’s and Bach’s view, the 
sentence ‘Jill is tall’ is seen as incomplete because it is seen as underdetermined. In the quote 
above, Carston argues for a linguistically determined input, and she claims that this is 
something everyone can agree on. Arguably this is precisely the same as the Semantic 
Minimalist claim. As an attempted persuasion, the Semantic Minimalist can in this connection 
assert: ‘If there is a linguistically determined input; there is a content that can be judged truth-
conditionally because there is a linguistically determined input.’ 
 Let’s look at Bach’s quote again:  
 
The fact that a sentence is semantically incomplete or underdeterminate does not mean that 
it is semantically defective. Yes, it does have a character deficiency, but still it has a definite 
content (or contents, if it is ambiguous), as given compositionally by the semantics. There 
is no empirical or theoretical reason why, at the level of semantics, the content of the 
sentence has to be supplemented or refined.
70
  
 
     The only difference at sight, compared with Semantic Minimalism is ‘the fact that a 
sentence is semantically incomplete or underdeterminate’. This need not be a fact if there is 
something that can be judged as a linguistically determined input as Carston put it, or a 
definite content as Bach put it. So, again the only difference is the different views on what 
counts as propositionality.   
 It is possible that we should leave it as a conclusion that there is no need to disagree about 
this, and rather focus on other issues. Now, the reason why we may want to keep this 
“confusion” or better; the central disagreement about this issue is because of how this issue 
relates to other issues. Generally, I think the conceptions sub-propositionality and 
propositionality are good tools for both sides of the debate.
71  
The semantic/pragmatic 
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distinction can if one want to stick to the idea of propositionality on both levels, simply be a 
divide between two sorts of propositionality, i.e., between semantic propositions or minimal 
propositions and pragmatic propositions (speech acts). On the contextualist approach; the 
pragmatic proposition is roughly separable between explicatures and implicatures.  
 In keeping the theoretical notions sub-propositionality and propositionality when 
considering linguistic meaning and/or semantic meaning one get the advantage of separating 
between stable propositions and in-stable propositions at the level of linguistic meaning. On 
this account is any in-stable proposition the same as a sub-proposition, and any stable 
proposition is a proposition. For an in-stable proposition to become a stable proposition some 
kind of application to context must be done. However this is done and when all such 
problems are solved what we have is semantics. So in general, in a lot of cases semantics is 
still some kind of hybrid between pragmatic, linguistic and syntactic features. The problems 
which have to be solved are in tension between the necessary pragmatics and how one applies 
the linguistic and syntactical forms or features. More generally put is to see the problem as a 
tension between linguistic meaning and propositionality. Now, whenever there is a tension 
between linguistic meaning and propositionality this is because the linguistic form has the 
status of a sub-proposition and something must be done in order to get propositional content. 
The great thing about stable linguistic propositions is that nothing has to be done because the 
linguistic meaning is equivalent to the semantic meaning and it is thereby propositional.  
 In arguing for this point my emphasis is directed to Cappelen and Lepore's conception of 
stable propositions. If we can label all the propositions they take to be stable, genuine 
propositions what we arguably have is an amount of sentences were all the problems can be 
seen as solved. This will of course indicate that we for instance are satisfied with their way of 
solving the problems concerning gradable adjectives.  
 
 
Emma Borg’s theory have as a central notion, the conception ‘liberal truth condition’ and this 
conception makes Borg the only entirely formal theorist or at least the only theorist which 
manages to account for propositions with all the problematic context-sensitive expressions 
without the application of real contextual features,   
                                                                                                                                                        
as if there were propositions lets us put readily available logical and linguistic devices to new expressive 
purposes, providing a way to make indirectly certain complicated, genuinely true assertions we cannot make 
directly. Proposition-talk thus extends the expressive capacity of a language in a logico-syntactically 
conservative way.” Woodbridge, James. A: 2006. ‘Propositions as Semantic Pretense.’. 343. In Language & 
Communication 26, 343 – 355. 
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Well, I want to suggest […] what I will call ‘liberal’ truth-conditions which are liberal since 
they clearly admit of satisfaction by a range of more specific states of affairs. A liberal 
truth-condition posits ‘extra’ syntactic material (i.e. material in the sub-syntactic basement) 
only when it is intuitively compelling to do so, or when there is good empirical evidence to 
support the move. Furthermore, what these truth-conditions take to be delivered by sub-
syntactic information is merely the presence of an additional argument place, marked by an 
existentially quantified argument place in the lexical entry, and not the contextually 
(intentionally) supplied value of this variable. Finally, when there is no evidence for 
positing an additional argument place within the sub-syntactic basement, liberal truth-
conditions run merely off the explicit syntactic constituents of the sentence (those given by 
uttered elements together with any genuinely elliptical items).
72
 
 
Compared to Cappelen and Lepore  account, the main difference is that they sees the  need for 
application of context when there is expressions from their list of genuinely context-sensitive 
expressions present in sentences. Borg on the other hand, solves this by positing ‘extra’ 
syntactical material from what she takes to be a sub-syntactic basement. Her list of 
expressions which is in need of treatment is more comprehensive than Cappelen and Lepore’s 
list. This is for instance comparative adjectives and names in addition to the expressions 
Cappelen and Lepore take to be context-sensitive.  
 The difference is again explainable with respect to the gradable adjectives and as we 
remember Cappelen and Lepore asserts that there is something which is ‘tall’ and ‘ready’ 
simpliciter without further extensions or conceptualization. In this connection Borg sees a 
problem concerning Cappelen and Lepore’s view on truth-conditionality, and it may be that 
Borg’s view on propositionality use a stronger truth-condition compared to theirs: 
 
In conversation, Herman Cappelen stressed that this is all IS (Insensitive Semantics) is 
committed to-the claim that Contextualists arguments against propositionalism are flawed. 
CL thus wish to remain agnostic on the truth of propositionalism (though since they are 
happy to allow that sentences like ‘Jill is ready’ express propositions, it is not immediately 
obvious what an example of a well-formed sentence which fails to express a proposition 
could look like for them). The Minimalism advocated in Borg 2004a thus goes further than 
CL: it holds as a default assumption that all well-formed sentences express propositions and 
argues that, since Contextualist arguments are flawed, propositionalism should be 
retained.
73
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Another issue is that Borg’s proposition can be viewed as being richer and bigger compared to 
the other main present theories. By introducing ‘extra’ syntactical material at the level of 
semantics, it is added conceptions comparable to those introduced by Bach concerning pure 
indexicals for all expressions which intuitively or empirically invites to it.  
 Let’s try to explain Borg’s view among Carston’s suggestions:  
 
(1) Context-independent linguistically encoded meaning (LEM) versus speaker meaning 
(or communicated meaning or utterance meaning). 
(2) LEM plus contextual values for pure indexicals versus speaker meaning. 
(3) LEM plus contextual values for all indexicals versus (the rest of) speaker meaning. 
(4) Minimal proposition expressed versus (the rest of) speaker meaning. 
(5) Intuitive proposition expressed versus (the rest of) speaker meaning.74 
 
I think the closest we come is a combination of option (3) and (4), but there will additionally 
be contextual values for other expressions as well. As we already know, the combination of 
option (3) and (4) is the same as Cappelen and Lepore’s suggestion is presented. So, option 
(3) seems to be in need of adjustment. 
 This may be a possible sixth option: 
 
(6) Minimal proposition plus formal contextual values for all expressions which 
intuitively or empirically demands for it versus the rest of speaker meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74
  Carston, Robyn. 2008. ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction.’,  3. 
46 Modularity _______________________________________________________________  
 
3. Modularity 
 
3.1 Modularity 
 
Borg’s strategy is to close the semantic domain formally, and then look at this domain in 
combination with the idea of a modular language of thought. The strategy is to show that there 
are radically different comprehension processes between decoding and abductive inference.  
The decoding which happens within a modular language of thought is taken to be 
encapsulated and as such seen as a closed system. Abductive inference or reasoning is in 
contrast to decoding seen as non-demonstrative, and as such viewed to be global processing. 
The main point for how Borg uses this distinction is, I think, that decoding is seen as 
demonstrative by operating with signs, and abductive reasoning is not seen as operating with 
signs. 
 One hypothesis is that the decoding happens in an independent module in our brains and 
that the abductive inferences happen in another part, but Borg is not all that convinced about 
this. She lends support from Sperber and Wilson: “For it might be (as, say, Sperber and 
Wilson have argued) that linguistic comprehension is a sub-module of a broader, 
communicative comprehension.”75 Borg takes linguistic comprehension to be encapsulated 
within a representational system comparable to the Relevance Theorists’ mental 
representation system. The idea of encapsulation is important to her formal program. One way 
to look at her strategy, is that she takes the general idea of semantic minimalism and relocates 
it with the idea of a sub-module which is encapsulated as a comprehension module only 
dealing with linguistic meaning (and rules). She writes; “[...], because the formal approach 
treats linguistic meaning as determinable by purely computational processes, it is consistent 
with the existence of a discrete body of information, and rules operating only over that 
information, which underpins our linguistic comprehension up to and including grasp of 
literal sentence meaning.”76 
 There is also a debate about how the term ‘modular’ should be used, and in Borg’s 
framework it is only the decoding taken to be encapsulated within a language of thought, 
which is seen as deserving the label 'modular': 
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For, by Fodorian Lights, the things posited by MM look far more like non-modular, global 
processes. For instance, to take one apparent example of a non-Fodorian module: the theory 
of mind module (often referred to as the agent's 'mind-reading' capacity). It seems clear that 
embarking on an intentional explanation of some piece of observed behavior depends upon 
precisely the kind of non-demonstrative, context-saturated and all-things considered 
reasoning which Fodor takes to be characteristic of global process. Thus, from now on, 
unless explicitly stated, the term 'module' will be reserved for an encapsulated body of 
information with deductive, computational rules operating only over that information. Any 
system employing abductive (i.e. non-demonstrative) reasoning processes will not be 
labeled a module.
77
 
 
The non-demonstrative features of Relevance Theory are at the core for criticism, but the 
adoption of a Fodorian module is the same. The sub-module where the comprehension 
process which underpins grasp of literal meaning is located, is the place for Mentalese. 
Mentalese is the name Fodor uses for a computational representational system which is the 
modular language of thought. Carston puts it like this: “Mentalese is the medium of thought. 
Given the computational view of mental states and processes, it follows that, for every feature 
of content that a thought process is sensitive to, there must be a formal element present in the 
Mentalese presentation of that content.”78 
 The mental representation is seen as independent and separable from the background, i.e., 
the abductive global mental “landscape”, but must however be seen as representing that part 
in the abductive domain which is restricted to the mental representation. So the entities 
referred to will be located in the abductive domain, while the Mentalese expressions are 
located in the mental representation. Carston’s assumption is that Mentalese sentences are not 
underdetermined and as such eternal sentences: 
 
Mentalese sentences do not underdetermine their truth-conditional content, they are not 
context-sensitive, they are eternal. Given the formality constraint, Mentalese sentences and 
phrases must be unambiguous; that is, there are no elements of form which have several 
distinct semantic values, as do 'bank' and 'visiting relatives' in English. Otherwise, a 'bank' 
thought would send you off on two wildly divergent inferential tracks. Similar 
considerations would seem to apply to indexicals. For instance, take the thought of a person 
who, if she wanted to express it, might utter the English sentence “That one is better than 
that one”, while pointing first at one object, then at another (say, two cars). The English 
sentence contains identical elements for referring to the two cars, but the Mentalese 
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sentence must contain distinct components. If it did not, that thought would be 
indistinguishable from a nonsensical one in which a person predicates of an object that it is 
better than itself. In fact, the issue is wider than this example makes it seem; it doesn't arise 
just for utterances involving multiple uses of an indexical. A thought about a particular 
object, say a vase I am looking at, which could be expressed by an utterance of “That's 
beautiful”, must surely involve a formal component that distinguishes it from those 
thoughts I have about other objects which could also be expressed by the utterance of a 
“that” sentence. Otherwise, we could not keep track (to the quite considerable extent that 
we do) of distinct objects in our environment.
79
 
 
I think the idea of eternal sentences as presented above is quite problematic. The main reason 
for this is because they are dependent on epistemological factors. Carston's example 'That one 
is better than that one', where the mental representation is something like 'That one* is better 
than that one^' is meant to solve the problem of indexicality and indeterminacy by 
distinguishing between the two cars pointed at. This, arguably does not contribute to make it 
evident that the sentence is context independent and eternal. The context dependency is 
reinforced and the sentence can't be eternal. Still, the problems concerning ambiguity and 
indexicality are given a solution. The problem is that, as presented above, the solution to 
these problems is presented as a connection of thought to the external world. A possible 
solution could be: yes, the content of the sentence is context-sensitive, but the sentence itself 
is not, so since it is not context-sensitive, it is eternal. I will argue that this doesn't work 
because of the dependency on context.  
 An advantage which comes with the idea of a modular language of thought, is the point 
that the language is richer and more nuanced than any natural linguistic language. So with 
this basis, and the idea of decoding operating only with the rules connected to expressions 
and compositionality, we have an area of theorizing dealing only with semantics. What we 
need is a way of explaining semantics without context, and the idea of truth-conditionality 
and propositionality should, I think, find its place under the assumption that this is possible in 
order to have a genuine minimal semantics.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79
  Carston, Robyn. 2004. Thoughts and Utterances. ‘Pragmatics and Linguistic Underdeterminacy.’, 75. 
 _______________________________________________________________ Modularity  49 
 
3.2 Modularity, Indexicals and Extensions  
 
Borg’s solution seems to be explainable as a formalization of at least some explicatures or 
parts of explicatures. So her proposition is lesser than any explicatures or implicitures, but 
(arguably) larger than any of the presented minimal propositions or sub-propositions.  
 The idea of a Fodorian language of thought, is an assumption Borg and Carston share, but 
how they exploit this idea seems partly different. The disagreement about what they take to be 
genuine propositionality can be seen in this light. As Carston points out: a thought can’t be 
inexplicit; so a sentence like ‘Jane is old, she is 29 years old,’ is on this view unproblematic 
because the mental representation of the sentence has different signs or representations for the 
different logged meanings of ‘old’ (and of course because the meaning of the expressions is 
determined by the compositionality of the sentence, but the main point is that it is possible to 
operate with different nodes for the same expression).  
 The difference between Borg’s proposition and Carston’s mental representation can be 
explained as follows: There is a mental representation which has the content ‘Jill is ready for 
basket-ball practice’. The uttered sentence is ‘Jill is ready’. The explicature and intuitive 
proposition to be interpreted can be represented as follows: 
 
1. Jill is ready [for basket-ball practice]. 
 
The content in the brackets is not uttered content, so it has to be pragmatically enriched by an 
interpreter. Still, the mental representation contains all the elements in the explicature, so the 
semantics in the mental representation is seen as the truth-conditional content, and as the 
genuine proposition. Borg’s formal solution is to formalize a general extension, as in: 
 
2. Jill is ready [for something]. 
 
The proposition in (2.) is an example of what Borg takes to be a genuine proposition and 
solution for the rejection of incompleteness arguments. The proposition in (1.) is meant to 
show how a sentence is seen as underdetermined, and the genuine proposition is the explicit 
content plus the material in the brackets. 
 The general idea and understanding of a Fodorian language of thought may be the same for 
Carston and Borg, but they both use it to motivate their views of what a theory of language 
should look like. This is Borg's conditional claim: 
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[…]if we thought that grasp of literal linguistic meaning was a modular process, then the 
right kind of theory to account for semantic understanding would be a formal theory. For 
this kind of approach to semantics, grasp of literal linguistic meaning is a purely 
computational process; it can be calculated by processes which are sensitive only to the 
local properties of syntactic representations, rather than via sensitivity to global features, 
like the agent's entire belief set. In this section I have tried to suggest that there is good 
reason to think the antecedent of the above conditional claim is true: there intuitively does 
seem to be a level of content which can be recovered by competent language users when 
faced with a sentence of a natural language, the grasp of which displays all the properties 
which are taken to be characteristic of genuinely modular activities.
80
 
 
As we see, Borg is talking about grasp of literal linguistic meaning and semantic 
understanding, and is thereby not considering the mental representation of for instance ‘Jill is 
ready for basket-ball practice’. The content Borg is considering is ‘Jill is ready’.  
 The distinction between syntactic representation and global features is the same on their 
views, so the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is the same when the cognitive 
apparatus is considered. That is, if the semantic content of a mental representation is ‘Jill is 
ready for basket-ball practice’, then, this and only this is the content of that mental 
representation, and is true if and only if Jill is ready for basket-ball practice. So, the main 
disagreement is still about what counts as a proposition. This is not entirely true: Carston 
objects to Borg’s proposition in two ways: the first claim is that it is not propositional; the 
second objection is that her extensional content is not a linguistic or semantic matter, but a 
pragmatic matter. The latter objection is, I think, dependent on what a semantic matter really 
consist of and what a pragmatic matter consist of. What belongs to which domain, is I think, 
in some cases quite hard to decide. 
 In Carston’s review of Borg’s book, she endorses her solution for demonstrative and 
indexical expressions and admits that it is more elaborated than the suggestions made so far 
by herself and the Relevance Theorists:    
 
The second (and innovative) part of Borg’s story is her idea that each tokening of a 
demonstrative or indexical syntactically triggers the creation of a singular concept which is 
its semantic content. A singular concept (as opposed to a general concept) is one that refers 
directly to (has as its content) an object, but figuring out who or what that object standardly 
is requires consideration of speaker intentions and so is a task that lies beyond the remit of 
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the formal semantic processor. According to this account, what we grasp when we 
understand an utterance of “That’s mine” is the proposition or thought of the shape [α is 
β’s] where ‘α’ and ‘β’ are singular concepts. Each comes with a further bit of information 
along the lines that ‘α’ is a THAT concept while ‘β’ is a SPEAKER concept, information 
provided by the (non-truth-conditional) semantic character of the linguistic expressions, 
which functions as a constraint on how the concepts are subsequently integrated with other 
language-module-external information (from perception or memory), specifically in the 
pragmatic process of identifying the entity the speaker is referring to.
81
 
 
Borg goes through a lot of material from the debate about indexicals and demonstratives in 
her book. Carston's presentation of Borg’s solution is quite right, and is, as Carston writes 
after the quote above, meant to be a critical response to John Perry's solution in his book 
Reference and Reflexivity.
82
 
83
 
 This is how Borg presents Perry's suggestion:  
 
Perry suggests that statements involving context-dependent expressions possess (at least) 
two different kinds, or levels, of content, which he calls “reflexive” and “referential” 
contents. The latter is exhausted by the object referred to; thus, if we are thinking in terms 
of Russellian propositions, the referential content of a referring term will be just the object 
it contributes to a Russellian proposition (rather than any description of that object). On the 
other hand, reflexive content utilizes the descriptive condition under which the referent is 
selected; it is reflexive since the condition to be met mentions the token expression itself. 
So, for instance, imagine an utterance u of “I am happy”, as said by s. This yields the 
reflexive proposition that the speaker of u is happy as well as the referential proposition s is 
happy. However, and this is where things can be tricky, Perry also notes that the descriptive 
condition appearing in the reflexive proposition can, as it were, get used, rather than being 
mentioned as part of the content of the proposition.
84
 
 
Perry’s theory is a nuanced theory which operates with quite a few propositions related to a 
given sentence. The most important distinction is as mentioned in the quote, the distinction 
between reflexive and referential content. Borg’s criticism of Perry’s theory is focused on the 
conception of reflexive content and has something to do with it being used rather than being 
mentioned. Still, as she notes above, the reflexivity is about the mentioning of the token 
expression itself, and this idea is present in Borg’s theory.    
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 The idea is that there are descriptions or rules for the use of such expressions, the 
designation of the object is rigid, and the description or rule is functioning as a reflection of 
the object, at the same time as it explains fundamental features of the semantics for such 
expressions. The difference between the two solutions is explainable as different views of 
how to apply Kaplan’s concept ‘character’.85 Character, in Kaplan’s framework, is a variety of 
sense, and is contrasted to content. “The content of an expression is always taken with respect 
to a given context.”86 And this is contrasted to character as follows: 
 
[…] I call that component of the sense of an expression which determines how the content 
is determined by the context the “character” of an expression. Just as contents (or 
intensions) can be represented by functions from possible worlds to extensions, so 
characters can be represented by functions from contexts to contents The character of “I” 
would then be represented by the function (or rule, if you prefer) which assigns to each 
context that content which is representated by the constant function from possible worlds to 
the agent of the context. The latter function has been called an “individual concept”.87 
 
Borg’s suggestion is that ‘β’ is taken to be a SPEAKER concept where ‘β’ is a meta-
representation of an instance of 'I' in a sentence. The rule or description is viewed as a 
constant function, but is not taken to be part of the propositional content or the semantics for 
the expression. Kaplan’s 'dthat' operator is used as a converter from the description or rule to 
a single concept for the explanation of the indexical 'I'. This is put as follows: “'(ii) That dthat 
(the speaker of u) is F'.”88 The converter takes a general concept and converts it into a 
singular concept.  
 
For all we really have at the level of the content of the proposition in (ii) is the object which 
the description selects in the actual context of utterance; once it has served (using Kripke's 
terminology) to fix the referent of the expression, the identifying condition drops out of the 
picture (it does not also give the meaning of the expression). The claim I would like to 
make, then, is that for an indexical or demonstrative expression, the content that can be 
recovered on the basis of an agent's knowledge of language alone (the genuinely semantic 
content of the token expression) is a proposition like (ii) [...].
89
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Borg claims that all we really have at the level of content of the proposition in (ii) is the 
object selected in the actual context. The rule or description is only taken to be an identifying 
condition, which is operative at the time of the selection of the object. Then she says that the 
content to be recovered as the genuine semantic content is a proposition like (ii). So the 
content is taken to be: ‘(ii) That dthat (the speaker of u) is F'. So Borg suggests that the 
identifying condition 'the speaker of u' in the brackets is not present in the proposition, but is 
only an identifying condition. So the content of the token expression ‘I’ which is part of the 
proposition is explainable as the (‘β’) of u as in “That dthat (‘β’) is F”.  
 That she takes into account an actual context for the explanation seems to me a little 
strange, considering that she also holds the following to be true:  
 
The claim will be that, whatever is special about having a singular thought, it is not to be 
explained in terms of the kind of relationship an agent has with an object. This, then, will 
be one instance of the more general advocacy of minimal semantics, for it will thus turn out 
that it is no job of a semantic theory to tell us, in any substantial way, which objects in the 
world expressions hook up to, nor indeed whether or not certain expressions succeed in 
hooking up with an object at all.
90
  
 
This explanation makes Carston’s explanation of Borg’s solution quite right. So I interpret 
Borg’s solution as not dependent on an actual context. Further, I take her to hold that the 
objects of thought belong in the abductive domain of thought, and the signs or nodes 
connecting to the objects, to belong in the domain of the mental representation or Mentalese. 
So, there should be no dependency on actual contexts for the explanation of semantics on 
Borg’s view.  
 The identifying condition seems only to be a processing mechanism and not part of the 
semantics for the expression. So it belongs in the domain of what she takes to be 
encapsulated, but since it is not part of the proposition, it is arguably not semantics. (Borg 
does in fact think that the character (identifying condition) is part of the semantics or 
linguistic meaning for the expressions, but she still holds that it is not propositional content.)   
 I agree with Borg that characters are semantic content, but contrary to her suggestion, I 
think it is part of the proposition. I think it is right to distinguish between the nodes or the 
signs and the decoding or linguistic comprehension, but it is also right to say that an essential 
part of the meaning of referring expressions is the function of identification. So I think there 
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must be a way to explain the identifying conditions as part of the semantic content and 
propositional content.   
 Borg’s solution for indexicals and demonstratives is similar in some respect to the solution 
for the other contexts sensitive expressions. The similarity is of course generally the concept 
of attaching extensions to expressions, but also perhaps explainable as making room for a 
somewhat empty or open context which can contain operators, rules, descriptions or general 
descriptive content. In connection with the concept for 'ready', she adds an extension ‘for 
something’, and this I will label ‘context “neutral” general descriptive content’.  
 A sentence like 'I am ready' has two extensions on Borg’s view: I [referring to a salient 
dthat (‘β’)] am ready [for something]. The most important difference between the two 
expressions 'I' and 'ready' with their respective extensions is that the first is a (or becomes a) 
singular concept and the second is a general concept. The distinction between singular and 
general concepts is traditionally taken to be important, and Borg thinks so too: 
 
One natural way of spelling out this difference - between meta-language expressions which 
directly invoke objects and those which do not - concerns the kinds of thoughts which are 
required to understand the expressions in question. Thus, for instance, “that boy is happy” 
and “some boy is happy” mean radically different things because, in the first case, the 
sentence possesses a truth-condition with a referential meta-language expression in subject 
position which requires the entertaining of a singular thought to understand (a thought 
involving a singular concept in subject position) while, in the second case, the thought 
entertained is general or object-independent, since “some boy” contributes only a general 
concept to the thought entertained. (In what follows, I will use the terms “singular concept” 
and “singular thought” more or less interchangeably, for all that is meant by a singular 
thought is a thought with a singular concept in subject position; mutatis mutandis for 
“general concept”/”general thought”. The assumption being that a singular thought is not an 
atomic element, but is rather composed of a representation of the object and a 
representation of the property.)
91
  
  
 On Borg’s view, the idea is that there is a singular concept entertained in connection with 
the indexical ‘I’. The identifying condition is a general concept functioning as a converter.  
 As put above, it is the meta-language expressions which directly invoke objects or not. 
This is connected with the idea that there are different kinds of thoughts required for the 
understanding of the expressions.   
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 Perry suggests that it is useful to distinguish between different types of propositions. The 
following presentation is a simplification of Perry’s nuanced way of using different 
propositions.  
 This is from his paper ‘Predelli’s threatening note: contexts, utterances, and tokens in the 
philosophy of language’: 
 
  On the reflexive-referential theory, the utterances have a variety of contents, the most 
important of which are the reflexive contents and referential contents. The referential 
contents of utterances of sentences containing names, indexicals, and demonstratives will 
be just those assigned by standard referential theories. The referential content of  
 
(5) I am sorry, 
 
 Uttered by me, is the proposition 
 
(6)  that John Perry is sorry. 
 
 When I use bold face in identifying propositions, it identifies a constituent of the 
proposition. 6, is a singular proposition with me as a constituent, true in worlds in which I 
am sorry. 
 I use italics to indicate that an identifying complex, rather than the object that fits it, is 
being mentioned. So the proposition 
 
(7) that the speaker of (5) is sorry 
 
 has an identifying condition as constituent; it is what Kaplan calls a ‘general proposition’ 
and is true in worlds in which whoever uttered (5) in the world is sorry there.  
 Kaplan and others use various arguments to show that (6) and not (7) is the proposition 
expressed by my utterance of (5); (6) is what I said. I agree with this. I call (6) the 
referential content or the subject matter content of (5). But I believe that it is useful also to 
recognize (7) as the reflexive content of (5). I call it ‘reflexive’ simply because it is a 
condition of (5) itself. (5) is not what (5) is about; it is not part of the subject matter of (5). 
Still, (5) will be true if (7) is true, and vice versa. I claim that the reflexive content helps us 
understand the reasoning that motivates the production of utterances, and the reasoning that 
is involved in their interpretation. 
 The systematic connection among the contents is loading. This is a function from an 
identifying condition and a state of affairs to an object. Thus (6) is the result of loading the 
identifying condition in (7) with the fact that I uttered (5).
92
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A general difference between Borg and Perry is that Borg is a Semantic Minimalist and Perry 
is a Moderate Contextualist. So there are differences in what they allow and take to be 
propositional content. Perry, however, operates with different types of content and 
propositions, which may or may not relate to each other. What is evident is that Borg doesn’t 
see the need to go as far as to account for the proposition in (6). This proposition is an 
example of what is said by (5) and has a real referent as a constituent. The proposition is a 
pragmatically derived proposition and is dependent on an actual context. This is often taken 
to be official content. Perry: “I’ll call this ‘official’ content. This is what someone who knows 
the meaning and the context grasps.”93  
 Perry presents the proposition in (6) as a singular proposition. This is because it has a 
particular object (John Perry) as a constituent of the proposition. Both the propositions in (6) 
and (7) are presented as identifying propositions and this is because they in different ways 
identifies the referents of the expression ‘I’ in sentence (5). The proposition in (6) has 
referential content, while the proposition in (7) has reflexive content. The latter content is 
presented as having an identifying complex as constituent and is taken to be a general 
proposition. 
 One difference between Borg’s and Perry’s theories is that Borg wants to explain one 
proposition in connection with a sentence and Perry operates with several propositions. 
 How the idea of character or reflexive content is seen as useful is at the core in Borg’s 
criticism of Perry’s suggestion, and she takes Perry to want to explain the content recoverable 
on the basis of linguistic knowledge alone. This is not true of the proposition in (6), but can at 
least sometimes or in some way be interpreted in connection with the proposition of (7).   
 
[…] he seems to suggest that it is the reflexive content of an utterance of a demonstrative- 
or indexical-containing sentence (where the identifying conditions themselves form part of 
the content of the proposition) which gives the content recoverable on the basis of linguistic 
knowledge alone. He suggests that the “indexical content” [...] of an utterance corresponds 
to the truth-conditions of the utterance given the facts that fix the language of the utterance, 
the words involved, their syntax and their meaning, and this appears to be the reflexive 
proposition: [...]
94
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From the perspective of there being explanatory problems rather than the issue of pragmatics, 
I think the only real difference between Perry's and Borg’s way of explaining how the 
character in sentence (7) 'that the speaker of (5) is sorry' is applied, is that he conforms with 
the fact that it is a general concept, and Borg is using the identifying condition to explain 
linguistic processing as a mediating principle - for the purpose of having a singular concept in 
her minimal proposition.  
 In Perry’s explanation above, the proposition in (6) identifies a constituent of the 
proposition, and this is the referential content. The proposition in (7), is presented as having 
an identifying condition for the understanding of the sentence in (5), for the aim of getting the 
proposition in (6). As Borg's complaint suggests; the identifying conditions themselves are 
loaded into the propositions.  
 One way to interpret Borg's criticism, is that she wants to neglect (7) and rather focus on 
the relationship between (5) and (6) without the need for a real referent. Still, (7) is presented 
as a mediating principle which disappears once the singular concept is fixed as a singular 
concept. So there is knowledge about there being a genuine referent and a general principle 
mediating between a genuine referent and the indexical or demonstrative involved, but they 
are not seen as part of the minimal propositional content. The structure of Perry's suggestion 
can be interpreted to be similar, but what they see as propositional content differs: “The 
systematic connection among the contents is loading. This is a function from an identifying 
condition and a state of affairs to an object. Thus (6) is the result of loading the identifying 
condition in (7) with the fact that I uttered (5).”95  
 Borg's account has a similar conception, but explains it without loading the identifying 
condition or real referents into the proposition. Perry's suggestion is that the identifying 
condition in (7) is loaded with the fact that (5) is uttered, so the character or identifying 
condition seems to become a constituent of the proposition of (6). The constituent in the 
proposition (6) is the “object” John Perry and the identifying condition is loaded with the 
fact that (5) is uttered. So it seems to me like the identifying condition in (7) rather is replaced 
with John Perry. The proposition in (7) has the identifying condition as constituent. 
 The concept ‘identifying condition’ is arguably the same concept Borg makes use of. So 
the difference which remains when the identifying condition is all we focus on, is that Borg 
uses the identifying condition as a converter between a general concept and a singular 
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concept, and Perry is accepting it as a general concept. But the object in (6) (John Perry), is a 
singular object, so the conception or methodology is the same or at least very similar.   
 The proposition in (6) is a singular proposition and what Perry takes to be what is said by 
the sentence (5). Now, there is a way to see Perry's proposition in (7) as an identifying 
condition between (5) and (6) and as an identifying condition between (5) and a proposition 
which is only reflexive and not referential. As for instance: (8) a person (the writer of (5)) is 
sorry. This may be the case if someone has written 'I am sorry' on a wall and we don't know 
who the writer is. The proposition in (8) is arguably just another way to explicate a 
proposition similar to (7) and a reflexive proposition like this is arguably pretty close to what 
Borg wants to explain, at least when we take Carston’ s explanation to be the right way to 
interpret Borg’s suggestion without the application of an actual context. Still, the identifying 
condition in Perry’s theory is general, but the object it is referring to is at least probably a 
singular object. (It is important that we don’t reach the proposition in (6) in such cases.) 
 The converter or the identifying condition is arguably syntactically triggered and this is 
something Borg and Perry agree on. So a central question is whether or not it belongs to the 
semantic or the pragmatic domain. Perry is, I think, more clearly suggesting that it belongs to 
the pragmatic domain and Borg seems to want to get rid of it as a constituent of her minimal 
proposition. So, on her view it is only an identifying condition or a converter, but this is 
(arguably at least partly) how it is used in Perry’s theory. Borg writes: “[…] character is 
certainly part of the literal meaning of the expressions in question, yet the modal evidence 
stressed by both Kaplan and Perry shows that character rules do not figure in the 
propositional, or truth-conditional, contribution the expressions make.”96 (What happened to 
the complaints about characters being loaded on to the propositional content?)  
 If the function or character of an expression is part of its semantic content, and in the case 
of the expression ‘I’, the function is to refer to the one thinking of it or using it or some other 
way of explaining it, there should be a way to explain this without the need for real context 
and hopefully without any assumed objective context. Explanations like ‘the speaker of ‘I’ or 
the ‘the writer of ‘I’ or ‘the thinker of ‘I’, is explaining the situation the person is in and the 
context is not objective because the context varies in connection with what kind of situation 
the person is in. Further, even if we could give an explanation from objective context, the 
meaning of the expressions is syntactically triggered. The characters should be explainable on 
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this basis only, so what I want is an explanation which is not explained as a function from 
context.   
 The indexical ‘I’ is often taken to be an entirely special case, which differs extensively 
from how all the other indexicals “behave”. As we remember, Bach takes the pure indexicals 
to connect to context in a way which separates them from all the other indexicals. The idea is 
that they are context-relative, but intention does not have to be a factor for the determination 
of their referents. I take what Bach says in the following quote to be quite sensible, and I 
think it can be helpful for how we should understand how the semantic content of indexical 
and demonstrative expressions should be explained:   
 
If the suggestion is to be genuinely semantic, the context-relative determination of the 
referent and the truth-condition cannot involve speaker's intention. If the speaker's intention 
were a factor, the suggestion would lose its semantic import. Or so I will argue. 
 The suggestion does apply to the special case of 'I'. One must use 'I' to refer to oneself, 
and that is a fact about its meaning. Moreover, who is using it is a fact about its context of 
utterance. And notice that there seems to be no description, not even an indexical one, 
capable of giving the meaning of 'I'. For example, 'the utterer of these words' will not do as 
a definition; since I could use that description to refer to the person I am presently quoting. 
The semantics of the word 'I' seems to come to no more and no less than the fact that to use 
it literally is to refer to oneself: the meaning of the word type is a rule for using a token of 
that type to refer-to oneself.
97
 
 
That the meaning of the word type is a rule for using a token of that type to refer to oneself, is 
perhaps all we need and can be seen as capturing the central idea of both Borg’s and Perry’s 
suggestions. I think the point that a singular concept is triggered by the rule or the description 
is right, and the language of thought hypothesis is needed for this explanation. Now, how this 
should be explained seems still to be problematic, and Bach’s explanation, that it is a fact that 
to use the indexical ‘I’ literally is to refer to oneself, can be understood as a rule that belongs 
to the semantic domain. Bach is critical of using definitions or descriptions for the 
explanation of indexicals and demonstratives, and I think he is right in being so. 
 As already noted, I think Carston’s presentation of Borg’s solution explains what is 
essential about Borg’s view. When it comes to the question of what is constituted as part of 
decoding, I think some kind of explanation of rules should be taken to be part of the semantic 
domain. In Carston's review of Borg's theory she says that she pretty much agrees with Borg's 
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solution, but she disagree with the propositionality claim at the level of linguistic meaning. 
This is in particular a comment on Borg's solution for indexicals:  
 
I find this a very appealing account since it is not only quite similar to the way in which the 
semantic representation (or logical form) of indexical sentences is envisaged in the 
relevance-theoretic framework I work with, but could be seen as a better worked out 
version of it than we've had up to now. We've talked in terms of indexicals triggering open 
slots or place-holders which carry certain constraints with them (as given by the lexical 
character of the indexical) (see Carston 2002, 60). It might well be that Borg's thin singular 
concepts provide a better, more precise, way of thinking about what the decoding of 
indexicals yields. […] the more immediate question in the current context is whether this 
“content” in which the referent remains unidentified really does constitute genuine full-
blooded truth-conditional content or is more akin to the schematic truth conditional 
template that the relevance-theorists and other contextualists maintain is the most that we 
get for sentence-type meaning.
98
 
 
The incompleteness argument is put in quite modest terms, but in knowing how Carston 
thinks of propositionality, it is quite understandable that she thinks of Borg's liberal truth-
condition as only reaching a sub-propositional level of content. 
  As we remember, Carston’s objection against Bach’s treatment of pure indexicals 
consisted in the claim that a description or rule like “‘I’ refers to the speaker or writer” cannot 
be loaded on the linguistic level, because this is part of the pragmatic domain. Let’s rehearse 
the argument: 
 
[…] narrow context as standardly construed does not give the right result for a whole host 
of utterances involving pure-indexicals. Consider, for example a post-it note, which says 
'I'll miss my office hour today', written by a departmental secretary sitting in her office one 
evening, who then attaches it to an absent professor's office door the next morning; clearly, 
the correct referent of 'I' and 'my' is not the writer of the note but the professor, and the 
correct referent of 'today' is not the day on which the note was written but the day on which 
it appears on the professor’s door.99 
  
The question is evidently put as ‘who is the writer of the ‘I’ll’ in the sentence ‘'I'll miss my 
office hour today'’. What Carston seems to argue for as a positive thesis, is that intention and 
wide context is involved, and as such it seems to work well as an argument against Bach’s 
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claim that ‘I’ is a pronoun where intention is not involved. But the proposition Carston has in 
mind, which requires real referents, is a pragmatically derived proposition. 
 The argument does not work very well as an argument against the point that there are rules 
or descriptions involved which is part of the semantics for the expressions. But it works as an 
argument against the assertion that the rules or descriptions are (universally) describable, as 
for instance in “’I’ refers to the speaker”. This point is Bach quite aware of, and he agrees 
with Carston on this. As we remember, he wrote: “And notice that there seems to be no 
description, not even an indexical one, capable of giving the meaning of 'I'. For example, 'the 
utterer of these words' will not do as a definition; since I could use that description to refer to 
the person I am presently quoting.”100 I take this to be enough as a response to Carston’s 
complaint. 
 What would be lovely is an explanation of how Carston can agree with Borg and not with 
Bach. Carston: “[…] (d) the somewhat mysterious “{singular, female}” is intended to 
indicate that the encoded linguistic meaning, or character, of the pronoun “she” does not enter 
into the logical form as a conceptual constituent but is instead a procedural indication to the 
pragmatic processor of the sort of entity being referred to; […]”101 The procedural indication, 
which is Carston’s way of applying the character of the expression, is comparable with how 
Borg applies it. Carston can be interpreted as not taking it to be a constituent of the semantic 
or the pragmatic domain. Instead it is a mediating principle which bridges the gap between 
semantics and pragmatics as a procedural indication. If this is right, it is problematic because 
elsewhere Carston has taken encoded linguistic meaning to be what she takes to be genuine 
semantic content for expressions. 
 What we perhaps should apply in this connection is the old Wittgensteinian idea that we 
know rules tacitly and that this knowledge is part of the known semantics (at least in some 
cases when the rules can be taken to be semantic rules). The tacitly known rules in connection 
with indexicals and demonstratives seem however not necessarily to be very tacit since we 
obviously can say something about them, but we are still facing a problem every time we try 
to explicate the rule for the indexical ‘I’ and other rules for other expressions. 
  
What I will assert, is that there are rules which are explicable in some cases and not so easily 
explicable in other cases, but that the rules are part of the semantics. This will be the case for 
the meaning of the comparative adjective ‘tall’ as well, and we seem to need some 
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explanation of the word as having something to do with measurement of length. This 
conception will do no harm to Cappelen and Lepore’s suggestion that ‘tall’ means tall 
simpliciter. This is because the suggestion does not take into consideration that something is 
measured as tall compared to something else. So there is no need for a comparison class 
which measures something in comparison with other things of the same kind (or another way 
of making a comparison class). So I agree with Cappelen and Lepore when they suggest that 
this is not needed, and that it is not part of an explanation of the semantics for the expression. 
The character is perhaps again hard to explain, but the semantic meaning of ‘tall’ has some 
explanation of measurement of length as character. In a context or in a sentence, the word can 
be used to measure something as ‘tall’ compared to something else, or it can be used to say 
that something is ‘tall’ without the comparison to something else.  
 That Borg is so strict about her account of the indexical ‘I’, may seem a bit strange when 
considering her liberal truth-condition. Borg’s “liberality” is liberal about how to make the 
choices of which expressions to be judged as context-sensitive, but also, I think, about what 
she takes onboard as semantic content and propositional content. In this connection I will say 
that I largely agree with Borg’s treatment of the indexical ‘I’, but I think the character is part 
of the proposition, so we disagree on this. This is what I think she is too strict about, and a 
little strange considering that her extension or place-holder makes room for what arguably is 
not part of the semantic meaning of for instance ‘ready’ as part of the propositional content.  
 Let's look at the above examples again: Carston’s explicature is ‘Jill is ready [for basket-
ball practice].’ In contrast to Borg’s minimal proposition: ‘Jill is ready [for something].’  
 In Carston’s explicature the rest of the speaker meaning is seen as (and is) a pragmatic 
matter, so I will propose that the generalized content “for something” in Borg’s minimal 
proposition also is a pragmatic matter. Borg has the same kind of explanation in connection 
with the verb ‘kicks’: 
 
So, say we have a transitive verb, the lexical entry for which tells us that it possess ‘slots’ 
for two arguments. If only one argument place is filled in the surface form of a particular 
utterance of that expression, the presence of the other argument place is nevertheless 
guaranteed by the sub-syntactic form. For instance, take the lexical entry for a verb like 
‘kicks’, treated as a transitive verb with one argument place for the agent and one for the 
object (so that the form of the relation is “x kicks y”). Then, if we get a surface level 
description of a sentence utilizing this expression, but with only one argument place 
explicitly filled (e.g. “John kicks”), the syntactic level description of that sentence will 
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nevertheless supply the second argument place, with an existentially bound variable acting 
as a placeholder, yielding “John kicks something” […].102 
 
As Borg notes, “treated as a transitive verb”, she may also see a way of treating it as an in-
transitive verb. Since the explanation of ‘ready’ is transitive all over, the complaint I am about 
to make can be considered to be about this expression and others as well.  
 In comparing the notions “ready” and “kicks” it seems intuitive to me that being ready 
more evidently is to be ready for something or other, compared to the probability of kicking 
as necessarily indicating that something is kicked. This seems however dependent on how the 
interpretation of 'something' is applied. If this can be about situations like ‘Jill kicks in the 
air’, as well as ‘Jill kicks a ball’, the generality of ‘something’ is perhaps the same for the 
expressions 'ready' and 'kicks'. The one way and down-top direction of fit endorsed by Borg, 
says that it is the syntactic features of the expression which triggers the extra place-holder or 
argument place. As an argument against this claim, one may suggest that what Borg really 
does, is to generalize features belonging to the pragmatic domain in a way which goes from 
context to linguistic meaning. So the proposed one way direction of fit is not really present. 
Instead it is a two way direction of fit, which goes from logical form to linguistic meaning, 
and from a special notion of what is said, to linguistic meaning. In other words, a down-top 
and a top-down direction of fit.  
 Borg’s suggestion is as we remember meant to function as a formal solution which solves 
the problem of underdeterminacy. The point that the extensions are triggered by the syntactic 
features of the expressions, and not by context, is meant to show that there are no 
unarticulated constituents present in the propositions. The extensions are thereby seen as 
articulated in the syntax, and as she puts it; are to be found in the sub-syntactic basement. 
 Borg quotes Recanati and shows that his view is quite close to her own, when only what is 
syntactically triggered is considered:  
 
In context, it may be that the unarticulated constituent is “required”; but then it is 
required in virtue of features of the context, not in virtue of the linguistic properties of 
the expression-type. A constituent is mandatory in the relevant sense only if in every 
context such a constituent has to be provided (precisely because the need for completion 
is not a contextual matter, but a context-independent property of the expression-type). 
This, then, is the criterion we must use when testing for (genuine) unarticulatedness: 
Can we imagine a context in which the same words are used normally, and a truth-
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evaluable statement is made, yet no such constituent is provided? If we can imagine 
such a context, then the relevant constituent is indeed unarticulated; if we cannot, it is 
articulated, at some level of linguistic analyses.
103
 
 
The main difference I am interested in between Recanatis’s and Borg’s view is that Recanati 
takes the constituent to be a matter of pragmatics, while Borg denies this. Both take the 
constituents to be needed for completeness, and whether or not this is the case, is another 
interesting question. The need for completeness is by Recanati not seen as a contextual 
matter, but as he puts it: it is a context-independent property of the expression-type. The 
judgment is dependent on the idea of objective context, i.e., that in every context a constituent 
is needed. This is what Borg agrees on, and what she doesn’t agree on is the point that 
pragmatics is involved, and this assertion is based on the view that the constituent is 
articulated because it is sub-syntactically triggered. Recanati operates with two distinct 
minimal propositions and pragmatics is involved in both cases:  
 
Let ‘what is saidmin’ be the proposition expressed by an utterance when the effects of 
top-down pragmatic processes such as free enrichment have been discounted, in 
accordance with Minimalism; and let ‘what is saidint’ correspond to the intuitive truth-
conditions of the utterance, which may well result from the operation of such processes. 
Both what is saidmin and what is saidint are influenced by pragmatic factors, but not to 
the same extent. If I am right what is saidint is affected by top-down processes such as 
free enrichment, whereas the only pragmatic processes that are allowed to affect what is 
saidmin are those that are triggered by something in the sentence itself.
104
 
 
I must say that I agree to a larger extent with Recanati than with Borg on this issue, but I will 
go further and say that even though we can imagine objective context, the content assumed to 
belong in objective context is contextual information. If it is not contextual information it is 
semantic content. So on my view, there is no need for extensions for expressions like ‘ready’ 
or ‘kicks’, if it is genuine semantics you want to explain. 
 As already mentioned, I think the extra place holder ‘for something’ or ‘something’ 
belongs to the pragmatic, contextual and abductive domain. Further, I don’t think that it is 
triggered by something found in a sub-syntactic basement. So I disagree with both Recanati 
and Borg on this. When this is said, I have no problem with the plausiblilty of there being 
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something which is kicked or something to be ready for in contexts when such expressions 
are used, so I agree with Recanati that it is influenced by pragmatic factors.  
 Arguably, if we are to explain a determinate level of semantic content, the meaning of the 
expressions should only reflect what is constituted in the expressions themselves, and not 
expand in context and reflect something else the expressions not are about. So I will simply 
assert that the distinction between transitive verbs and intransitive verbs is irrelevant for a 
minimal semantic theory. This is because we don’t need the extensions or extra place-holders, 
and because they are not part of the explanation of the expressions semantic meaning. 
 A semantic minimalist should reject the underdeterminacy thesis when such expressions as 
‘tall’, ‘ready’ and ‘continue’ is considered. These are determinable expressions without the 
need for extensions of the kind posited by Borg.  
  
All expressions have a character and this character in combination with the node or sign in a 
Mentalese language, is the semantic determinate content of the expressions, or so I will argue. 
 If we can claim that there is a determinate level of genuine semantic content, the 
propositions are arguably truth-evaluable. This will be the case for any well-formed 
declarative sentence.  
 There is no need for real referents. What we need is semantic content which is 
determinable. In connection with the indexicals and demonstratives, I believe it to be possible 
to deliver purely semantic explanations.  
 If there are any problems with the explanation of such expressions, the problems are not 
that the expressions lack referents, but rather that the meanings of the expressions are 
indeterminate, or that the expressions are so hard to explain, that they seem to be 
indeterminate.  
 The Mentalese sentences make it possible to distinguish between different concepts for the 
same words. So for instance in connection with the two meanings of ‘old’, the suggestion is 
that there are two different nodes for it, and there are two ways of decoding, which makes it 
possible to separate between the two meanings. That the meanings of the expressions are 
syntactically determined by the nodes or the words themselves and by compositionality seems 
to be the only criteria we need. 
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4.  Conclusions 
 
The introduction had a point claiming that Contextualism and Semantic Minimalism are 
dealing with different topics, but that this is only partly right. The focus of this thesis have 
been the area of theorizing where the two rather different positions overlap and are dealing 
with the same issue, i.e., linguistic or genuine semantic meaning. 
 As I have tried to show, the differences between the present Contextualists and Semantic 
Minimalists are perhaps lesser than one might have expected. This is most evident from the 
fact that they all claim that there is determinable genuine semantic content which can be 
recovered. The different views on propositionality, as either determined or underdetermined, 
are rooted in a difference in opinion about what a proposition is. Bach and Carston claim is 
that even if a sentence has determinable semantic content, the proposition is underdetermined 
because there is more than semantic content in a proposition (at least in most cases). Cappelen 
and Lepore agree with this when there are expressions from their list of context sensitive 
expressions present in sentences. Borg’s theory is the Semantic minimalist theory which at 
least tries to keep pragmatic intrusion at a distance all over. So, I take this theory to be most 
consistent on the issue of what kind of content which is considered as propositional.  
 The part of the debate which is about Contextualism and Semantic Minimalism trying to 
undermine each other in general, is almost not present in this thesis. This area of theorizing is 
of course also about the same theme, but I think the pre-conditions and methodology for their 
theorizing is too different for the debate to be interesting.  
 What I think is right is that the Semantic Minimalists may not have so much to learn from 
the Contextualists when the pragmatic principles are the issue, because this is outside their 
field of interest. On the other hand, I think the Contextualists has something to learn from the 
Semantic Minimalist, because the area of theorizing is an important part of Contextualism. 
The Semantic Minimalists, and in particular Cappelen and Lepore, do undermine 
Contextualism in general. This is because they model their theorizing on the view that 
minimal propositions are the only type of content which is explainable. 
 On my view there are at least three types of content: minimal propositions, explicatures (a 
special notion of what is said) and implicatures. In order to account for indexicals and 
demonstratives with real referents, the type of propositional content needed is an explicature. I 
take the explicature to include the type of content suggested by for instance Perry which 
includes referential content. This is his notion of what is said or the official content. I think 
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the level of an explicature at least sometimes can be seen as determinable and propositional. 
This is not the case with an implicature, but it is nevertheless valuable as a conception for the 
explanation of what is meant by the use of sentences and ostensive behavior. Such theorizing 
is on my view phenomenological in various degrees, dependent on the situation, epistemic 
access and other factors.  
 On this background, I have to say that I don’t think Speech-act Pluralism is the only way to 
deal with contextual propositions, but it is a theory which shows how content shifts between 
contexts. Context-shifting arguments are used by both the Semantic Minimalists and the 
Contextualists. The Contextualists uses the arguments to show that context is influential on 
semantic content, and the Semantic Minimalist uses the arguments to undermine 
Contextualism. Speech-act Pluralism, is then arguably already present in most or all 
Contextualist theories.  
 Carston’s aim in her article ‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics 
Distinction’ is to show that all the other ways of explaining genuine semantic content are 
blurring the distinction between semantic and pragmatic meaning, and I think this is true. This 
is as Carston suggests, more evident when it comes to the Semantic Minimalists theories and 
it is not so much the case when it comes to Bach’s view. This is first and foremost because it 
is more important for the Semantic Minimalist to account for minimal propositions, than it is 
to account for a purely semantic meaning. So even though the pragmatic principles for the 
most part are used by the Contextualists, there is some pragmatics within the Semantic 
Minimalist approaches. The different Semantic Minimalist approaches apply context and 
pragmatics quite differently. Borg's liberal truth-condition allows in connection with some 
expressions for content which I think belong on the pragmatic side of the distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics. Cappelen and Lepore are managing without context and pragmatic 
principles, as long as the expressions on the list of context-sensitive expressions are not 
present in sentences. When such expressions appear in sentences, context must be applied for 
the determination of the semantic values of the expressions. How this is done seems according 
to their theory, at least partly to be an open question. In some cases at least, both intention and 
wide-context are taken to be involved.  
 This is something Borg has a strong case against. Her aim is to solve the problems within 
the framework of her liberal truth-condition, and what she takes to be contained in the 
encapsulated modular domain of thought. So on this approach, wide-context and intention is 
kept outside of what she takes to be the semantic domain of content. Borg’s liberal truth-
condition is arguably more consistent about what kind of content it operates over, - roughly 
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only distinguishes between sentences with or without expressions in need of special treatment, 
in the form of adding extra place-holders or extensions.  
 On this background, Carston is quite right in her claim that the Semantic Minimalist takes 
more content on to their propositions than what is contained in what she takes to be semantic 
content on the level of logical-form and sub-propositional content. So there is a way to see a 
part of her position as more minimal compared to Semantic Minimalism.  
 It is still a bit unclear to me what Carston thinks is genuine semantics. The article 
‘Linguistic Communication and the Semantic-Pragmatics Distinction’ shows how she 
disagrees with the other views, but it lacks a positive explanation of what she takes to be 
genuine semantic content (or logical-form). What is evident is that she takes on board a 
concept of character as a mediating principle between logical-form and syntax and 
pragmatics, which is taken to be neither semantics nor pragmatics. So she is making room for 
what could have blurred her distinction and instead only thinks of it as a ‘procedural 
indication’. That a character of an expression can be seen as a mere procedural indication and 
as not part of the semantic content is, I think, wrong. Still, I have no problem with 
distinguishing between the concepts ‘procedural indication’ and ‘character’. These 
conceptions are explaining different things, but I think it is right that both procedural 
indication and characters belongs on the semantic side of the semantic/pragmatics distinction. 
Arguably, if it is not semantics, we don’t have meanings which are decoded. Decoded pieces 
of evidence are part of what Carston takes to be semantics, but in the case of indexicals and 
other complex expressions, we seem to be left with undecoded nodes.   
 I agree with Borg that there is a way to explain semantic processing in an assumed 
encapsulated sub-module in a larger module. The idea is that what is taken to be semantic 
meaning including characters is mapping on what is taken to be semantic processing and the 
result is the interpreted semantic content of sentences. The semantics is static and the 
processing is not, so we need a semantics for the aim of explaining what we take to be within 
the encapsulated modular domain of thought. 
 What I will argue is that such a level of semantic content is explainable, but it is perhaps at 
least partly an artificial construct.   
 Borg’s truth-condition, which only takes the necessity of content being truth-evaluable is 
the favorable option. This, is I think, is quite similar to how Cappelen and Lepore apply it, - at 
least when there are no expressions from their list of context-sensitive expressions present in 
sentences. When there for instance are indexicals or demonstratves in sentences, they see the 
need for real referents in actual contexts, so the truth-condition changes character in 
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connection with what kind of content it operates over. Whenever there is a sentence not 
containing expressions on the list of context sensitive expressions, the content needs only to 
be truth-evaluable. Whenever there is a sentence containing context sensitive expressions, the 
content must be supplied with contextual information in such a way that the content must be 
evaluable as true or false. On this background I don’t think Cappelen and Lepore’s theory is 
minimal enough, so I am in agreement with Carston and others about this. 
 I take any expression to have a stable or more than one stable meaning. The problem is 
only how this is explainable. As Kaplan and Perry suggests, the character of an expression is 
taken to be a function from context, but also that it is syntactically triggered. I take what the 
character reflex to the meaning of an expression, so I think it is entirely a semantic matter 
what the meaning of an expression is. Word meanings do of course change in connection with 
different intentions, context and background information, but this is nothing the Semantic 
Minimalist needs to worry about. This requires however, that the focus is pointed at semantics 
and not pragmatics.  
 Arguably, if one thinks that the truth-condition is needed on the level of communicated 
content, there should be no reason to think that the truth-condition is not needed at a semantic 
level. So I don’t think the Contextualists necessarily loose anything if they accept a Semantic 
Minimalist approach on semantic meaning. 
 Carston seems to think that the truth-condition applied by the Semantic Minimalists has an 
interpretative strength which is stronger than it actually is. This is because she thinks that 
sentences actually must be evaluable as true or false, and that it is not only a device for 
judging content as truth-evaluable or not. Her interpretation is however right in connection 
with the truth-conditionality posited by Cappelen and Lepore, when there are context 
dependent expressions present in sentences. 
 All parties agree to some extent that there is a determinable level of genuine semantic 
content. As already pointed out, the content in a determinable sentence is truth-evaluable. The 
same content is of course underdetermined, if you think there only is propositional content on 
the levels of explicatures and implicatures. As Bach and Carston put it, linguistic or semantic 
content is seen as determinable and underdetermined. It is not necessary to see it like that.  
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